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ARTICLES
THE GEOGRAPHY OF REVLON-LAND
Stephen M. Bainbridge*
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the Delaware
Supreme Court explained that, when a target board of directors enters
Revlon-land, the board’s role changes from that of “defenders of the
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders at a sale of the company.”
Unfortunately, the Court’s colorful metaphor obfuscated some serious
doctrinal problems. What standards of judicial review applied to director
conduct outside the borders of Revlon-land? What standard applied to
director conduct falling inside Revlon-land’s borders? And when did one
enter that mysterious country?
By the mid-1990s, the Delaware Supreme Court had worked out a
credible set of answers to those questions. The seemingly settled rules
made doctrinal sense and were sound from a policy perspective.
Indeed, my thesis herein is that Revlon and its progeny should be praised
for having grappled—mostly successfully—with the core problem of
corporation law: the tension between authority and accountability. A fully
specified account of corporate law must incorporate both values. On the
one hand, corporate law must implement the value of authority in
developing a set of rules and procedures providing efficient decision
making. U.S. corporate law does so by adopting a system of director
primacy.
In the director primacy (a.k.a. board-centric) form of corporate
governance, control is vested not in the hands of the firm’s so-called
owners—the shareholders—who exercise virtually no control over either
day-to-day operations or long-term policy, but in the hands of the board of
directors and their subordinate professional managers. On the other hand,
the separation of ownership and control in modern public corporations
obviously implicates important accountability concerns, which corporate
law must also address.
Academic critics of Delaware’s jurisprudence typically err because they
are preoccupied with accountability at the expense of authority. In
contrast, or so I will argue, Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence correctly
* William D. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
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recognizes that both authority and accountability have value. Achieving the
proper mix between these competing values is a daunting—but necessary—
task. Ultimately, authority and accountability cannot be reconciled. At
some point, greater accountability necessarily makes the decision-making
process less efficient. Making corporate law therefore requires a careful
balancing of these competing values. Striking such a balance is the
peculiar genius of Unocal and its progeny.
In recent years, however, the Delaware Chancery Court has gotten lost
in Revlon-land. A number of chancery decisions have drifted away from
the doctrinal parameters laid down by the Delaware Supreme Court. In
this Article, I argue that they have done so because the Chancellors have
misidentified the policy basis on which Revlon rests. Accordingly, I argue
that chancery should adopt a conflict of interest–based approach to
invoking Revlon, which focuses on where control of the resulting corporate
entity rests when the transaction is complete.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporation law statutes commonly offer two basic mechanisms by
which a company may be acquired: namely, the merger and the sale of all
or substantially all corporate assets.1 In addition to these statutory
acquisition techniques, there are a number of nonstatutory acquisition
methods, including the proxy contest, the tender offer, and stock
purchases.2 Among many factors distinguishing the two categories, one of
the most important is the role of the target’s board of directors. Statutory
forms, such as a merger or asset sale, require approval by the target’s
board.3 In contrast, the nonstatutory techniques do not. A proxy contest
obviously does not require board approval, although a shareholder vote is
1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2011) (merger); id. § 271 (sale of all or
substantially all corporate assets). See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW
338–40 (2d ed. 2009) (describing basic merger and asset sale techniques, as well as key
variants thereof).
2. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 340–41 (describing these techniques). The
appellation “statutory acquisition” refers to a form expressly created by state corporation
codes. Its counterpart, the term “nonstatutory acquisition,” simply means that it is a form
whose existence is not dependent on such a code. In general, however, the latter are not
unregulated. Instead, they typically are governed by federal securities law and, in some
cases, various state laws. Id. at 337 n.1.
3. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (“The board of directors of each
corporation which desires to merge or consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an
agreement of merger or consolidation and declaring its advisability.”); id. § 271(a) (“Every
corporation may at any meeting of its board of directors or governing body sell, lease or
exchange all or substantially all of its property and assets . . . as its board of directors or
governing body deems expedient and for the best interests of the corporation . . . .”).
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still required.4 A tender offer requires neither board approval nor a
shareholder vote; if the buyer ends up with a majority of the shares, it will
achieve control.5
The need for board approval creates insurmountable barriers to use of a
statutory form if the bidder is unable to secure board cooperation. Initially,
the nonstatutory forms eliminated this difficulty by permitting the bidder to
bypass the target’s board and obtain control directly from the stockholders.
Since the 1970s, however, the development of takeover defenses allowed
the target’s board to play a gatekeeping role in tender offers, not unlike its
role in statutory acquisition techniques.
The target board’s gatekeeping function poses the most basic question of
corporate governance; namely, who decides? Is the decision to accept or
reject an offer one for the shareholders or, as with all other important policy
questions, is it at least initially one for the board?6
One of the more interesting contexts in which that question arises is the
jurisprudential territory known as “Revlon-land.”7 In Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,8 the Delaware Supreme Court
explained that when a target board of directors enters Revlon-land, the
board’s role changes from that of “defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale
of the company.”9
Unfortunately, the court’s colorful metaphor obfuscated some serious
doctrinal problems. What standards of judicial review applied to director
conduct outside the borders of Revlon-land? What standard applied to
director conduct falling inside Revlon-land’s borders? And when did one
enter that mysterious country?
By the mid-1990s, the Delaware Supreme Court had worked out a
credible set of answers to those questions.10 The seemingly settled rules
4. See Morton A. Pierce, Mergers and Acquisitions in the 80’s and 90’s, in CONTESTS
279, 288 (1997) (“The proxy contest is a way to bypass the board
and enlist the help of stockholders to exert enough pressure on the board to obtain the
desired result.”).
5. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 95 (Del. Ch. 2011) (noting
that “traditionally the board has been given no statutory role in responding to a public tender
offer”).
6. See Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461,
521 (1992) (suggesting that “the fundamental governance question presented by unsolicited
offers” is whether the “right to decide whether to accept or reject the offer resides with the
shareholders or is it, like all other important policy questions, initially a decision for the
board to make until it reveals itself to be disabled by self-interest”).
7. The results of a search of the Westlaw DE-CS database identified the earliest judicial
use of the term Revlon-land as the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Arnold v. Society
for Savings Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994), in which the court observed that
terms like “Revlon duties” and “Revlon-land” were used “colloquially but inappropriately” to
refer to “the enhanced scrutiny courts accord to certain types of [takeover] transactions.” Id.
at 1289 n.40.
8. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
9. Id. at 182.
10. See infra Part II.D (discussing relevant precedents).
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
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made doctrinal sense and were sound from a policy perspective.11 Indeed,
my thesis herein is that Revlon and its progeny should be praised for having
grappled—mostly successfully—with the core problem of resolving the
tension between authority and accountability. A fully specified account of
corporate law must incorporate both values.12
Academic critics of Delaware’s jurisprudence typically err because they
are preoccupied with accountability at the expense of authority.13 In
contrast, or so I will argue, Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence correctly
recognizes that both authority and accountability have value.14 Achieving
the proper mix between these competing values is a daunting—but
necessary—task, because authority and accountability cannot be
reconciled.15 Making corporate law therefore requires a careful balancing
of these competing values. Striking such a balance is the peculiar genius of
Revlon and its progeny.
In recent years, however, the Delaware Chancery Court has gotten lost in
Revlon-land. A number of chancery decisions have drifted away from the
doctrinal parameters laid down by the Delaware Supreme Court.16 In this
Article, I argue that they have done so because the Chancellors have
misidentified the policy basis on which Revlon rests. Accordingly, I argue
that chancery should adopt a conflict of interest–based approach to
invoking Revlon, which focuses on where control of the resulting corporate
entity rests when the transaction is complete.
In order to accurately map Revlon-land, some of the surrounding
doctrinal territory must also be explored. Accordingly, Part I of this Article
begins the analysis by contrasting the target board of directors’ role in
negotiated acquisitions, such as mergers or asset sales, with its role in
hostile takeovers. Part I argues that the target board faces important
conflicts of interest in both settings, but that the conflicts presented in the
latter setting are especially significant. Because Revlon deals only with a
subset of hostile takeover fights, Part I examines in some detail the
Delaware Supreme Court’s prior decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co.,17 which laid the broader doctrinal foundation on which
Revlon rests. In addition, Part I explores the policy tensions the Delaware
courts were forced to resolve in Unocal and its progeny.

11. See infra Part II.C (discussing relevant precedents).
12. See Dooley, supra note 6, at 463–64 (arguing that “any feasible governance system
must and does contain elements of both . . . Authority or Responsibility”).
13. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 171–74 (1991) (arguing that there are systemic agency cost effects
when management resists a takeover bid); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board
Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 993–94 (2002) (discussing the role of
the hostile takeover as a constraint on agency costs).
14. See infra Part II.D (summarizing Delaware law).
15. See Dooley, supra note 6, at 464 (noting that authority and accountability “are also
antithetical, and more of one means less of the other”).
16. See infra Part IV.
17. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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Part II traces the development of Revlon up to the point in the mid-1990s
at which the law seemed well settled. Part III maps Revlon-land as it had
been carved out in that evolutionary process. In both parts, the Article
argues that the end result of that process made both doctrinal logic and
sound policy sense.
Part IV critiques the recent chancery court cases that have departed from
the prescribed borders of Revlon-land. In it, the author argues that those
cases are inconsistent with prior law and with sound policy.
I. REVLON’S ANTECEDENTS
Revlon and its progeny are a subset of the much larger body of takeover
jurisprudence whose modern roots go back to Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co.18 As a result, one of Revlon-land’s critical landmarks is the
location of the crossing point at which the case is no longer governed by
Unocal but rather by Revlon.19 Of course, one also is constrained to ask
what, if anything, changes when directors morph from “defenders of the
corporate bastion” into “auctioneers.”20 Accordingly, devoting some
attention to both the policy questions the Unocal court faced and the
evolution of the standard that the court developed to answer them is
necessary to lay the foundation for the analysis of Revlon that follows.
A. Who Decides?
There is no more basic governance question than that of “who decides?”
Or, put another way, which organizational constituent possesses the
ultimate right of control?
Ownership and control rights typically go hand in hand. A principal is
entitled to control his agent, for example.21 Each partner is entitled to equal
rights in the management of the partnership business.22
In the corporation, however, ownership and control are decisively
separated. The Delaware General Corporation Law vests control in the
board of directors, for example, by providing that the corporation’s
“business and affairs . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors.”23 In contrast, the firm’s owners—the shareholders—
exercise virtually no control over either day-to-day operations or long-term
18. Id. For a discussion of Delaware’s pre-Unocal takeover jurisprudence and the ways
in which Unocal superseded it, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 386–91 (describing the
evolution of Delaware law).
19. Cf. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150–51 (Del. 1989)
(noting that, in some cases, “Revlon duties are not triggered, though Unocal duties attach” to
the target’s board of directors and managers). See generally infra note 214 and
accompanying text (discussing Revlon-triggering events).
20. See infra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing whether the Revlon and
Unocal standards differ).
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 (2006) (setting out an agent’s duty to
obey the principal).
22. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 4.01(a)(1) (1997).
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).
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policy.24 Shareholder voting rights are limited to the election of directors
and a few relatively rare matters such as approval of charter or bylaw
amendments, mergers, sales of substantially all of the corporation’s assets,
and voluntary dissolution.25 As a formal matter, moreover, only the
election of directors and amending the bylaws do not require board
approval before shareholder action is possible.26 In practice, of course,
even the election of directors (absent a proxy contest) is predetermined by
virtue of the existing board’s power to nominate the next year’s board.27
The shareholders’ limited control rights thus are almost entirely reactive
rather than proactive.28
The sharply “limited governance role assigned to shareholders is
intentional and is, in fact, the genius of the corporate form.”29 This is so
because, taken together, the rules empowering directors and disempowering
shareholders create a board-centric form of corporate governance, in which
the board of directors is not a mere agent of the shareholders, but rather is a
sui generis body whose powers are original and nondelegated.30 To be
sure, the directors are obliged to use their powers toward the end of
shareholder wealth maximization, but decisions as to how that end shall be
achieved are vested in the board, not the shareholders.31
The prestigious American Bar Association’s Committee on Corporate
Laws, which has drafting responsibility for the widely adopted Model
Business Corporation Act, recently affirmed that director primacy both is
and ought to be the basic organizing principle of corporate law. The
Committee explained that “the deployment of diverse investors’ capital by
24. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932) (describing the effects of the separation of ownership and
control). I use the term “ownership” here in its colloquial sense, while recognizing that,
“[i]n the dominant nexus of contracts theory of the firm, ownership is not a meaningful
concept because shareholders are simply one of the inputs bound together by this web of
voluntary agreements.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in
Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 n.9 (2002).
25. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 174–77 (1995)
(summarizing state corporate law on shareholder voting entitlements).
26. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 211 (setting forth shareholder rights).
27. See Bayless Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1485–89 (1958) (reviewing
J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER (1958)) (describing how incumbent
directors control the proxy voting machinery).
28. Cf. In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 415 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding
that “director primacy remains the centerpiece of Delaware law, even when a controlling
stockholder is present”).
29. Michael P. Dooley, Controlling Giant Corporations: The Question of Legitimacy, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PAST & FUTURE 28, 38 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1982).
30. The discussion of director primacy herein draws on earlier work, especially Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 547 (2003).
31. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the
end itself . . . .”).
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centralized management maximizes corporate America’s ability to
contribute to long-term wealth creation.”32 As the Committee further
explained, the “board centric” model gives shareholders
the regular opportunity to elect the members of the board, but during the
directors’ terms, the board has the power, informed by each director’s
decisions in the exercise of his or her fiduciary duties, to direct and
oversee the pursuit of the board’s vision of what is best for the
corporation.33

The board of directors thus is an example of what Nobel laureate
economist Kenneth Arrow identified as authority-based decision-making
structures.34 Such structures are characterized by the existence of a central
agency to which all relevant information is transmitted and which is
empowered to make decisions binding on the whole.35 They tend to arise
where the constituents of an organization have differing interests, there are
information asymmetries among the constituents, and collective action
problems make participatory democracy infeasible.36
The public corporation is a classic example of just such an organization.
As my colleague Iman Anabtawi observes, “On close analysis, shareholder
interests look highly fragmented.”37 She documents divergences among
investors along multiple fault lines, such as short-term versus long-term
investment horizons, diversified versus undiversified portfolios, inside
versus outside shareholders, investors with social goals versus those with
solely economic goals, and hedged versus nonhedged investors.38 Even if
that were not the case, moreover, shareholders would still face difficult
collective action problems in making routine corporate decisions.39
Accordingly, the public corporation succeeded as a business organization
form because it provides a hierarchical decision-making structure well
suited to the problem of operating a large business enterprise with
numerous employees, managers, shareholders, creditors, and other inputs.
In such a firm, someone must be in charge. “Under conditions of widely
32. COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF BUS. LAW, REPORT
ON THE ROLES OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS OF PUBLICLY OWNED
CORPORATIONS (2010), available at http://www.hunton.com/media/SEC_Proxy/PDF/SEC_
Agenda_Section2.PDF.
33. Id.
34. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68–70 (1974).
35. See id. at 69 (providing examples of authority-based decision-making structures).
36. Bainbridge, supra note 30, at 557.
37. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 561, 564 (2006).
38. See id. at 577–93 (describing such differences in investor interests and preferences).
39. See Blake H. Crawford, Eliminating the Executive Overcompensation Problem:
How the SEC and Congress Have Failed and Why Shareholders Can Prevail, 2 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 273, 312 (2009) (“The collective action problem occurs when
dispersed shareholders, who lack the power to make significant changes individually, remain
passive in their decisions . . . .”); cf. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 338 (Del. Ch. 1997)
(noting that courts “are not unmindful of the collective action problem faced by shareholders
in public corporations”).
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dispersed information and the need for speed in decisions, authoritative
control at the tactical level is essential for success.”40 As we have seen,
corporate law rests that control in the board rather than the shareholders.
The ABA Committee justified that statutory allocation of control on
somewhat different grounds, explaining that if board of director decisions
were subjected to frequent shareholder review “the time and attention of
managers could, in many cases, be diverted from activities designed to
pursue sustainable economic benefit for the corporation.”41 In addition, the
Committee expressed concern that broad shareholder decision-making
powers might be abused by “particular shareholders who may have interests
that diverge from those of other shareholders or interests other than
sustainable economic benefit.”42 This concern was exacerbated in the
Committee’s view because noncontrolling “shareholders generally do not
owe fiduciary duties to each other or the corporation,” which meant that
they could not be held responsible for how they used the levers of
shareholder democracy.43
The core question posed in Unocal and its progeny is whether corporate
takeovers present unique considerations justifying a less board-centric
governance regime than that which thus pervades the rest of corporation
law. As we shall see, the Delaware courts have concluded that they do
not.44 In my opinion, the Delaware courts have gotten it broadly right in so
holding.45
B. The Board As Gatekeeper
In their efforts to decide who decides, the Delaware courts have grappled
with the limits of a target corporation’s board of directors’ power to act as a
gatekeeper in corporate acquisitions. In other words, to what extent can the
target’s board of directors prevent the target’s shareholders from deciding
whether the company should be acquired?
In a merger, two corporations combine to form a single entity.46 In an
asset sale, the selling corporation transfers all or substantially all of its

40. ARROW, supra note 34, at 69.
41. COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, supra note 32, at 5.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See infra Part I.D (discussing Unocal and its progeny).
45. See infra Part I.E (discussing policy aspects of Unocal).
46. Under Delaware law, effecting this transaction requires four basic steps. First, an
“agreement of merger” must be drafted, specifying the deal’s terms and conditions, including
the terms required by Delaware General Corporation Law § 251(b). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 251(b) (2011). The board of directors must adopt a resolution approving the agreement.
The shareholders then must approve the agreement. Unlike most corporate actions, which
only require approval by a majority of those shares present and voting, a merger requires
approval by a majority of the outstanding shares. Finally, either the agreement or a
certificate of merger must be filed with the Secretary of State.
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assets to the buyer. In both transactions, approval by the target board of
directors is an essential precondition.47
In both major forms of statutory acquisitions, the board thus has a
gatekeeping function. Shareholders have no power to initiate either a
merger or asset sale, because the statute makes board approval a condition
precedent to the shareholder vote.48 If the board rejects a merger proposal,
the shareholders thus have no right to review that decision.49 Instead, the
shareholder role is purely reactive, coming into play only once the board
approves a merger proposal.50
The board also has sole power to negotiate the terms on which the
merger will take place and to enter a definitive merger agreement
embodying its decisions. Shareholders have no statutory right to amend
or veto specific provisions, their role typically being limited to approving
or disapproving the merger agreement as a whole . . . .51

If the board disapproves of a prospective acquisition, the would-be
acquirer therefore must resort to one of the nonstatutory acquisition devices.
The proxy contest, share purchase, and tender offer all allow the bidder to
bypass the target board and make an offer directly to the target’s
shareholders. Since the 1960s, the tender offer has been the most important
and powerful of these tools.52 Almost as soon as the hostile tender offer
emerged as a viable acquirer tactic, however, lawyers and investment
bankers working for target boards began to develop defensive tactics
designed to impede such offers.53 If validated by the courts, these takeover
defenses promised to reassert the board’s primacy by extending its
gatekeeping function to the nonstatutory acquisition setting.
Consider the poison pill, for example, which has been called the “de
rigeur tool of a board responding to a third-party tender offer.”54 Poison
pills take a wide variety of forms, but most are based on a form of security
known as a right.55 Traditional rights are issued by corporations in forms

47. See id. § 251(b) (imposing requirement of board approval of a merger); id. § 271
(setting forth requirements for asset sale).
48. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in Negotiated
Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 259 (1990).
49. See id. at 259 n.83 (explaining that “the rejection decision [is] vested in the unilateral
discretion of the board of directors”).
50. Id. at 259.
51. Id.
52. See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the
Shareholder Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 276
(2001) (noting “the widespread use of the cash tender offer in the 1960s and the rise in
prominence of hostile takeovers in subsequent decades”).
53. For an overview of takeover defenses, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 376–86.
54. In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 431 (Del. Ch. 2002).
55. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 379. The Delaware General Corporation Law
authorizes corporations to “create and issue . . . rights or options entitling the holders thereof
to acquire from the corporation any shares of its capital stock of any class or classes, such
rights or options to be evidenced by or in such instrument or instruments as shall be
approved by the board of directors.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(a) (2011).

2013]

THE GEOGRAPHY OF REVLON-LAND

3287

giving the holder the option to buy stock in the issuer on specified terms.56
In contrast, the poison pill has no real financing purpose.57 Instead, it is
intended to prohibitively raise the cost of acquiring the issuer without the
consent of its board.58 In order to do so, the pill includes three additional
elements not found in traditional rights: a flip-in element, a flip-over
element, and a redemption provision.59
The pill’s flip-in element is triggered by the acquisition by a potential
bidder of some specified percentage of the issuer’s common stock.60 If
triggered, the flip-in pill entitles the holder of each right—except the
potential bidder and its affiliates or associates—to buy authorized but
unissued shares of the target issuer’s common stock or other securities at a
substantial discount from the market price.61 The deterrent effect of such a
flip-in pill arises out of the massive dilution the pill causes to the value of
the target stock owned by an unwanted acquirer.62
The pill’s flip-over feature typically is triggered if, following the
acquisition of a specified percentage of the target’s common stock, the
target is subsequently merged into the acquirer or one of its affiliates.63 In
such an event, the holder of each right becomes entitled to purchase
common stock of the acquiring company, at a substantial discount to
market, thereby impairing the acquirer’s capital structure and drastically
diluting the interest of the acquirer’s other stockholders.64
Because the rights trade separately from the issuer’s common stock, an
acquirer remains subject to the pill’s poisonous effects even if an
overwhelming majority of the target’s shareholders accept the bidder’s
tender offer.65 In the face of a pill, a prospective acquirer thus has a strong
incentive to negotiate with the target’s board. Pills therefore include a
redemption provision pursuant to which the board may redeem the rights at

56. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 295 (11th ed. 2010) (describing stock rights); see also Grimes v.
Alteon, Inc., 804 A.2d 256, 264–65 (Del. 2002) (holding that the term “right” as used in
section 157 includes but is not limited to “options or option-like transactions”).
57. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted Bylaws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 440 n.135 (1998) (explaining that “one
of the criticisms of the ‘poison pill’ was . . . that [it] had no economic substance . . . unless
and until a hostile acquisition or some other defined triggering event occurred”).
58. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1369 n.6 (Del. 1995) (explaining
that a poison pill “dilutes the would-be acquiror’s stake in the company and increases the
costs of acquisition”).
59. See KLEIN, supra note 56, at 196 (describing these elements). Note that the board of
directors adopts the pill by resolution without any shareholder action. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del.
Ch. 1988) (explaining that, if triggered, Pillsbury’s poison pill would have reduced Grand
Met’s interest in Pillsbury from 85 to 56 percent and cut the value of Grand Met’s Pillsbury
holdings by more than $700 million dollars).
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a nominal price at any time prior to the right being exercised if a friendly
deal can be negotiated.66 Proponents of pills contend that these plans thus
do not deter takeover bids, but rather simply give the target board leverage
to negotiate the best possible deal for their shareholders or to find a
competing bid.67 In any case, it is clear that “the poison pill has made the
board the ‘gatekeeper’ instead of the shareholders.”68 As a result, target
boards have been empowered to play an active—and often determinative—
role in the very class of transactions originally designed to bypass them
entirely.
C. The Target Board’s Conflict of Interest
Corporate law’s allocation of primary responsibility for negotiating a
merger agreement to the target’s board of directors69 is sound policy. The
board knows much more than its shareholders about the company’s
business goals and opportunities.70 The board also knows more about the
extent to which a proposed merger would promote accomplishment of those
goals.71 In addition to this information asymmetry, the familiar array of
collective action problems that plague shareholder participation in corporate
decision making obviously preclude any meaningful role for shareholders in
negotiating a merger agreement.72 Taken together, these factors justify
corporate law’s allocation of the sole power to negotiate mergers to the
board. It also justifies the requirement that shareholders vote on the merger
agreement as a whole, rather than allowing them to approve or disapprove
specific provisions.
As with any conferral of plenary authority, the board’s power to make
decisions about negotiated acquisitions gives rise to the potential for abuse.
Because the target’s board of directors must approve a merger proposal
before the transaction is submitted for shareholder approval, the bidder at
the very least may have to compensate the incumbents for the loss of the
rents associated with their offices, thereby reducing the amount that can be
66. See KLEIN, supra note 56, at 196 (describing redemption provisions).
67. See id. (describing purported purpose of the pill).
68. Wayne O. Hanewicz, When Silence Is Golden: Why the Business Judgment Rule
Should Apply to No-Shops in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements, 28 J. CORP. L. 205, 237
(2003).
69. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text (discussing relevant statutes and case
law).
70. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is “Say on Pay” Justified?, 32 REG. 42, 47 (2009)
(“Whatever flaws board governance may have, they pale in comparison to the information
asymmetries and collective action problems that lead most shareholders to be rationally
apathetic.”).
71. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1198–99 (1981)
(arguing that corporate law grants the board decision-making authority because the directors
have a competitive advantage over the shareholders in choosing between competing
alternatives).
72. See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 619 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(“A good board is best positioned to extract a price at the highest possible level because it
does not suffer from the collective action problem of disaggregated stockholders.”).

2013]

THE GEOGRAPHY OF REVLON-LAND

3289

paid to the target shareholders for the sale of the firm. In addition, the
bidder may seek to purchase the board’s cooperation by offering directors
and/or senior managers side payments, such as an equity stake in the
surviving entity, employment or noncompetition contracts, substantial
severance payments, continuation of existing fringe benefits, or other
compensation arrangements.73 Although it is undoubtedly rare for side
payments to be so large as to materially affect the price the bidder would
otherwise be able to pay target shareholders, side payments may affect
target board decision making by inducing the board to agree to an
acquisition price lower than that which could be obtained from hard
bargaining or open bidding.74 At the extreme, moreover, incumbents may
be unwilling to surrender their positions on any terms that are acceptable to
the bidder.
Despite this well-known conflict of interest, the Delaware cases
consistently apply the business judgment rule to board decisions to approve
a merger.75 This judicial hesitation to second-guess board merger decisions
is also sound policy, reflecting an appropriate balance between the
competing claims of authority and accountability.
Most corporate law scholars “believe that the fundamental concern of
corporate law is ‘agency costs.’”76 To be sure, this belief has a hallowed
pedigree. After all, Berle and Means famously claimed that “the separation
of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of
owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where
many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power
Noted economists Jensen and Meckling, moreover,
disappear.”77
subsequently formalized this concern by developing the concept of agency
costs.78
73. See, e.g., Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 617, 620
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (white knight offered target management equity stake); Singer v. Magnavox
Co., 380 A.2d 969, 971 (Del. 1977) (target directors offered employment contracts); Gilbert
v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1984) (plaintiff alleged tender offeror
modified bid to benefit target managers).
74. Pupecki v. James Madison Corp., 382 N.E.2d 1030, 1031–32 (Mass. 1978) (plaintiff
claimed that consideration for sale of assets was reduced due to side-payments to controlling
shareholder); Barr v. Wackman, 329 N.E.2d 180, 184 (N.Y. 1975) (plaintiff claimed target
directors agreed to low acquisition price in exchange for employment contracts). In many
cases, there may also be at work “a force more subtle than a desire to maintain a title or
office in order to assure continued salary or prerequisites,” as where managers’ self-identity
is wrapped up in their employer. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880,
at *715 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
75. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
76. Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 295
(1998).
77. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 24, at 6.
78. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Agency costs
are defined as the sum of the monitoring and bonding costs, plus any residual loss, incurred
to prevent shirking by agents. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 304 (1983). In turn, shirking is defined to
include any action by a member of a production team that diverges from the interests of the
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Granted, deterrence and punishment of misconduct by the board and
senior management is a necessary function of corporate governance.79
Accountability standing alone, however, is an inadequate normative account
of corporate law.80 In order for corporations to be governed efficiently and
effectively, deference must be paid to the corporation’s authority-based
decision-making structure. Because corporate law could substantially
reduce agency costs by eliminating the board’s discretionary powers, but
has chosen not to do so, it is reasonable to infer that substantial efficiency
gains follow from vesting the board with discretionary authority. A
complete theory of the firm therefore requires one to balance the virtues of
discretion against the need to require that discretion be used responsibly.81
The problem is that achieving an appropriate mix between authority and
accountability is a daunting task. Ultimately, authority and accountability
cannot be reconciled. At some point, greater accountability necessarily
makes the decision-making process less efficient, while highly efficient
decision-making structures necessarily entail nonreviewable discretion.
This is so because, as Arrow observed, “If every decision of A is to be
reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of authority
from A to B and hence no solution to the original problem.”82
Shareholder oversight of board decisions—whether through the vote or in
courts—would effect just such a shift. Such oversight necessarily
contemplates outside review of management decisions, with shareholders or
judges stepping in to make corrections and changes when management
performance falters. If shareholders could easily obtain such reviews,
directors likely would be more accountable to them, but the board’s powers
would become merely advisory rather than authoritative. The efficient
separation of ownership and control that makes the modern corporation
possible thus is inconsistent with routine shareholder—or judicial—review
of board decisions.
The importance corporate law places on deference to the board’s
authority is forcefully illustrated by the classic decision in Bayer v. Beran,83
which held that the business judgment rule exists so as to “encourage
freedom of action on the part of directors, or to put it another way, to

team as a whole. As such, shirking includes not only culpable cheating, but also negligence,
oversight, incapacity, and even honest mistakes. Dooley, supra note 6, at 465.
79. The discussion herein of the tradeoff between authority and accountability again
draws on earlier work. See Bainbridge, supra note 30, at 572–73.
80. See Dooley, supra note 6, at 463 (arguing that neither authority nor accountability
standing alone “could provide a sensible guide to the governance of firm-organized
economic activity because each seeks to achieve a distinct and separate value that is essential
to the survival of any firm. Accordingly, any feasible governance system must and does
contain elements of both.”).
81. See id. at 471 (arguing that the business judgment rule reflects a tension between
“conflicting values” that Dooley refers to as “[a]uthority” and “[r]esponsibility”).
82. ARROW, supra note 34, at 78.
83. 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
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discourage interference with the exercise of their free and independent
judgment.”84 Accordingly, business decisions are:
[L]eft solely to [the directors’] honest and unselfish decision, for their
powers therein are without limitation and free from restraint, and the
exercise of them for the common and general interests of the corporation
may not be questioned, although the results show that what they did was
unwise or inexpedient.85

At the same time, however, Bayer also recognized the key limitation on
judicial deference to the board’s authority, in that “[t]he ‘business judgment
rule’ . . . yields to the rule of undivided loyalty. This great rule of law is
designed ‘to avoid the possibility of fraud and to avoid the temptation of
self-interest.’”86
Where the directors’ decision is tainted by the potential for
considerations other than shareholder wealth to drive their choice, as where
the directors will be tempted to engage in self-dealing, the question is no
longer one of honest error but of intentional misconduct. The affirmative
case for disregarding honest errors simply does not apply to intentional
misconduct.87 To the contrary, given the potential for self-dealing in an
organization characterized by a separation of ownership and control, the
risk of legal liability may be a necessary deterrent against such
misconduct.88 As former Delaware Chief Justice Veasey observed,
“[I]nvestors do not want self-dealing directors or those bent on
entrenchment in office. . . . Trust of directors is the key because of the selfgoverning nature of corporate law. Yet the law is strong enough to rein in
directors who would flirt with an abuse of that trust.”89
The law is able to defer to most director decisions because agency costs
are adequately constrained by market and other extralegal forces. Although
the partition admittedly is somewhat artificial, it is useful to begin the
defense of that proposition with the distinction between judicial review of
operational issues and structural choices, especially those creating a final
period situation, such as takeovers.90
Operational decisions appropriately receive much less probing review
than do decisions relating to final period transactions.91 This is so because
most operational decisions do not pose much of a conflict between the
interests of directors and shareholders. In game theory terminology,
84. Id. at 6.
85. Id. (quoting Pollitz v. Wabash R. Co., 100 N.E. 721, 724 (N.Y. 1912)).
86. Id. (quoting In re Ryan’s Will, 52 N.E.2d 909, 912 (N.Y. 1943)).
87. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 266–67 (2002)
(discussing the differences between self-dealing and errors of judgment).
88. See id. at 306–07 (discussing the necessity for judicial review of loyalty issues).
89. E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in
Corporate Law, 53 BUS. LAW. 681, 694 (1998).
90. See E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America,
52 BUS. LAW. 393, 394 (1997) (drawing a similar distinction between “enterprise” and
“ownership” decisions).
91. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 87, at 284–86 (discussing precedents).
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operational decisions take place in a board-shareholder relationship
consisting of an ongoing series of repeat transactions.92 In repeat game
settings, the actors’ decisions are constrained by the threat that cheating in
one turn will be punished by the other party in future turns. To be sure,
shareholder discipline is not a very important check on directorial selfdealing, for the reasons we have already discussed.93 Yet, shareholder
voting is just one of an array of extrajudicial constraints that, in totality,
incentivize directors to exercise reasonable care in decision making. In
particular, directors and managers are subject to important constraints
imposed by the product and job markets.94 True, these constraining forces
do not eliminate the possibility of director error. The directors will still err
from time to time. That is precisely the sort of error, however, that the
courts traditionally—and appropriately—eschew reviewing.
In contrast, structural decisions—such as corporate takeovers—present a
final period problem entailing an especially severe conflict of interest.
Even so, however, in an arm’s-length merger, the board’s potential conflict
of interest is again policed by a variety of extralegal constraints. First,
independent directors and shareholders must be persuaded to approve the
transaction.95 Second, ill-advised acquisitions are likely to cause the
acquiring firm problems in the capital markets, which may constrain its
willingness to divert gains from target shareholders to the target’s board and
managers.96
Third, and even more important, negotiated acquisitions are subject to the
constraining influences of the market for corporate control. Where the
target’s board accepts a low initial offer, a second bidder may succeed by
offering shareholders a higher-priced alternative.97
Of course, the
competing bidder’s transaction cannot be structured as a merger or asset
sale if it is unable to persuade target management to change sides. Even so,
the intervener has a formidable alternative in the tender offer, which
provides a safety valve by eliminating the need for target board cooperation
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text.
94. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986), rev’d
on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (arguing that “competition in the product and labor
markets and in the market for corporate control provides sufficient punishment for
businessmen who commit more than their share of business mistakes”); Lisa M. Fairfax,
Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal
Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 429 (2005) (“As members of these various communities,
directors have strong incentives to perform their duties in a manner that does not damage
their reputation within these communities.”).
95. Cf. Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 207 (Del. 2008) (“Independence means that a
director’s decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather
than extraneous considerations or influences.”).
96. Cf. Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?,
98 J. POL. ECON. 372 (1990) (documenting that firms that overpay in acquisitions frequently
become targets for other acquirers).
97. Cf. Heath Price Tarbert, Merger Breakup Fees: A Critical Challenge to AngloAmerican Corporate Law, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 627, 633 (2003) (explaining that
“second bidders usually succeed”).
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by permitting the bidder to buy a controlling share block directly from the
stockholders.98
In a hostile acquisition, the prospective acquirer must bypass the board
from the outset. In the absence of the poison pill or other takeover
defenses, however, any conflicted interests on the part of target directors or
managers are mitigated because shareholders are free to sell or not as they
see fit. Where the target deploys a pill or takes other defensive actions,
those actions are inevitably tainted by the specter of self-interest.99 Unlike
the negotiated takeover, moreover, there is no market safety valve. It was
precisely this policy concern that motivated the Delaware Supreme Court to
adopt the more intrusive Unocal standard of review for dealing with
defenses against unsolicited takeovers.
D. Unocal
Target board resistance to an unsolicited takeover bid presented the
Delaware Supreme Court with a difficult doctrinal choice. Whether the
problem is framed as a question of care or of loyalty has vital—indeed,
potentially outcome determinative—consequences.100 If the court invoked
the duty of loyalty, with its accompanying intrinsic fairness standard of
review, the defendant directors would be required—subject to close and
exacting judicial scrutiny—to establish that the transaction was objectively
fair to the corporation.101 Because this burden is an exceedingly difficult
one to bear, takeover defenses would rarely pass muster.102 Accordingly, a
court should treat resistance to unsolicited takeovers as implicating the
board’s duty of loyalty only if it concludes that takeover defenses are
almost per se adverse to shareholder interests.
On the other hand, if the court treated takeover defenses as a care
question, plaintiff would have to rebut the business judgment rule’s
presumptions by showing that the decision was tainted by fraud, illegality,

98. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text (explaining how a tender offer allows
an acquirer to bypass the target’s board).
99. Dynamics Corp., 794 F.2d at 256 (“When managers are busy erecting obstacles to
the taking over of the corporation by an investor who is likely to fire them if the takeover
attempt succeeds, they have a clear conflict of interest, and it is not cured by vesting the
power of decision in a board of directors in which insiders are a minority . . . .”).
100. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988)
(recognizing that the choice of duty of care versus duty of loyalty would be outcome
determinative); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del.
Ch. 1986) (same).
101. See Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(discussing the relevant standard of review); cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,
722 (Del. 1971) (discussing the application of the intrinsic fairness standard to fiduciary
duties of majority shareholders).
102. Cf. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (explaining that the
court’s decision to apply entire fairness standard of review in cases implicating the duty of
loyalty invokes a standard so exacting that it frequently, albeit not always, results in a
finding of liability).
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self-dealing, or some other exception to the rule.103 Absent the proverbial
smoking gun, plaintiff is unlikely to prevail under this standard.104 A duty
of care analysis thus makes sense only if one thinks management resistance
to takeovers is almost always constrained so as to ameliorate the conflict of
interest inherent therein.
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court attempted to steer a middle
course by promulgating what has been called an “intermediate” or
“enhanced business judgment” standard of judicial review, but is perhaps
best described as a “conditional business judgment rule.”105 In Unocal,
famed corporate raider T. Boone Pickens’s Mesa Petroleum Company,
whom the court referred to as having “a national reputation as a
‘greenmailer,’”106 made an unsolicited, structurally coercive two-tier
takeover bid for Unocal.107 In response, Unocal’s board of directors
authorized the company to make a discriminatory self-tender offer for its
own stock.108 Mesa sued, arguing that Unocal’s board of directors had
breached its fiduciary duties.
103. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating that the business
judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company”).
104. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he fact is that liability is
rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this
reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally
labeled the business judgment rule.”), cert. denied sub nom. Citytrust v. Joy, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983).
105. DOOLEY, supra note 25, at 547.
106. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985).
107. Pickens initially acquired 13 percent of Unocal’s voting stock through his main
corporate vehicle, Mesa Petroleum. Id. at 949. Mesa thereafter launched what the court
called “a two-tier ‘front loaded’ cash tender offer for 64 million shares, or approximately 37
percent, of Unocal’s outstanding stock at a price of $54 per share.” Id. If that offer
succeeded, the second-tier transaction would consist of a freeze-out merger to eliminate the
remaining shares, in which the consideration would be junk bonds ostensibly worth $54 per
Unocal share. See id. (describing the “back-end” transaction).
Mesa’s offer is now regarded as being “structurally coercive.” Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There
Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 259 (1989). To simplify the
problem, suppose Target’s pre-bid stock price was $50. Bidder 1 makes a two-tier offer with
differing prices: $80 cash in the first-step tender offer and $60 cash in the second step
freeze-out merger. Assuming the first-step tender offer seeks 50 percent of the shares plus
one, the blended offer price is $70 with a blended premium of $20 per share (calculated by
taking the weighted average of the two steps). Bidder 2 offers $75 in cash for any and all
shares tendered, a premium of $25 per share. As a group, shareholders are better off with
Bidder 2. Yet, Bidder 1’s offer creates a prisoners’ dilemma. Those shareholders who
“cheat,” by taking Bidder 1’s front-end offer, end up with $80 rather than $75. With a large
noncohesive group in which defectors bear no cost—such as shame or reprisals—rational
investors should defect. Because everyone’s individual incentive is to defect, the
shareholders end up with the offer that is worst for the group. Mesa’s offer differed from
this example by offering the same price in both steps, but the far less attractive form of
consideration to be paid in the second step would have similarly coercive effects.
108. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 951. The offer was discriminatory because Pickens could not
tender into it. Id. Under Unocal’s counter offer, if Mesa’s front-end tender offer succeeded
in giving Mesa a majority of Unocal’s stock, Unocal would repurchase the remaining
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In rejecting Mesa’s claims, the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed the
target board’s general decision-making primacy, while also reaffirming the
board’s obligation to determine whether the offer is in the best interests of
the shareholders.109 In light of the board’s potential conflict of interest visà-vis the shareholders, however, judicial review was to be somewhat more
intrusive than under the traditional business judgment rule.110
Unocal thus affirmed that the target board of directors has not just the
power but also the “fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the
corporation’s stockholders,” which sometimes may include resistance to an
unsolicited takeover bid.111 The board’s powers in this regard, however,
“are not absolute.”112 Accordingly, the target’s board “does not have
unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any Draconian means
available.”113
The initial burden of proof is on the target’s board of directors, which
must show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to
corporate policy or effectiveness was posed by the unsolicited takeover
bid.114 The board satisfies that burden “by showing good faith and
reasonable investigation.”115
Assuming the directors carry this initial burden, they next must prove
that the defense was “reasonable in relationship to the threat posed” by the

minority shares with debt securities worth $72. Id. It would leave the company drained of
significant assets and burdened by substantial debt, albeit still “a viable entity.” Id. at 950.
109. See id. at 954 (“When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation
to determine whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.”).
110. Id. (“Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced
duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the
business judgment rule may be conferred.”).
111. Id. at 955; see also Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152
(Del. 1989) (“We have repeatedly stated that the refusal to entertain an offer may comport
with a valid exercise of a board’s business judgment.”).
112. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
113. Id.
114. Id. (“In the face of this inherent conflict directors must show that they had
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed
because of another person’s stock ownership.”). In addition, Unocal requires proof that the
target’s board of directors had the authority under the governing statutes and the
corporation’s organic documents to take the specific action in question. Moran v. Household
Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350–51 (Del. 1985).
115. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964)).
This standard requires, inter alia, a showing that the directors acted in response to a
perceived threat to the corporation and not for the purpose of entrenching themselves in
office. See id. (holding that the target board must show that it “had reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed”). The reasonable
investigation element requires a demonstration that the board was adequately informed, with
the relevant standard being one of gross negligence. See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep’t
Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (interpreting Delaware precedents to
require the court to “consider whether the Board made an ‘informed’ decision based on
reasonable investigation, considered under a standard of gross negligence”).
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hostile bid.116 If the directors meet this two-step burden, the business
judgment rule applies, but if the directors fail to carry their initial burden,
the duty of loyalty’s intrinsic fairness test applies.117
E. Evaluating Unocal
Many academic commentators have argued that target directors should
have a modest gatekeeping role—if any—in unsolicited takeovers.
Professors Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, for example, went to the
extreme of proposing that complete passivity should be required of
incumbent directors and managers of a target company in the face of an
unsolicited offer.118 In Unocal, however, the Delaware Supreme Court
explicitly rejected Easterbrook and Fischel’s passivity approach.119
Given the Delaware courts’ “normal sensitivity to conflicts of interest”120
and the undeniable fact that a passivity rule would do a more thorough job
of constraining the board’s conflicted interests than does Unocal, is it
surprising Delaware courts rejected passivity and adopted a standard
permitting target resistance?121 Analysis should begin with the proposition
that all doctrinal responses to corporate conflict of interest transactions have
two features in common. First, so long as the board of directors is
disinterested and independent, it retains full decision-making authority with
respect to the transaction.122 Second, the board’s independence and
116. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Note that both the decision to adopt and any subsequent
decision to implement a set of takeover defenses are subject to challenge and judicial review.
See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354. In Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., plaintiffs sued when the
target first adopted a poison pill, before any takeover bid had been made. The court upheld
the pill as valid, but explained:
When the Household Board of Directors is faced with a tender offer and a
request to redeem the [pill], they will not be able to arbitrarily reject the offer.
They will be held to the same fiduciary standards any other board of directors
would be held to in deciding to adopt a defensive mechanism, the same standard as
they were held to in originally approving the [pill].
Id. at 1354. In Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88 (Del. Ch. 2000), the chancery court
explained that:
Delaware case law has assured stockholders that the fact that the court has
approved a board’s decision to put defenses in place on a clear day does not mean
that the board will escape its burden to justify its use of those defenses in the heat
of battle under the Unocal standard.
Id. at 106–07.
117. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 271 (Del. Ch. 1989).
118. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in
Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71. For a
critique of Easterbrook and Fischel’s argument that takeovers have systemic effects
generating social welfare from both ex ante and ex post perspectives, see BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 87, at 697–700, 715–18.
119. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 n.10 (noting academic suggestions that “a board’s response
to a takeover threat should be a passive one,” the court opined that “that clearly is not the
law of Delaware”).
120. Dooley, supra note 6, at 515.
121. See id. (noting that “many have been perplexed and some dismayed by the
[Delaware] courts’ refusal to ban or at least severely limit target board resistance”).
122. See id. at 488.
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decision-making process is subject to judicial scrutiny.123 Corporate law
thus neither prohibits transactions nor requires complete board passivity in
connection with them simply because they potentially involve conflicts of
interest. Instead, it regulates them in ways designed to constrain selfinterested behavior. Unocal simply brought these well-established rules to
bear on the conflicts of interest created by target resistance to unsolicited
offers.124 Unless one believes that the conflict of interest inherent when
boards choose to resist an unsolicited offer differs in kind rather than just
degree from other conflicted interests, there was no need to develop a
radically different set of rules to deal with such resistance.125
II. REVLON AND PROGENY
In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court was obliged to determine
whether the Unocal standard applied to so-called deal protection devices.
These corporate finance tools come into play in two basic situations. First,
they may be used in a negotiated acquisition to deter competitive bids.126
Second, in corporate control contests, such as the one that took place in
Revlon, they may be used to ensure that a white knight prevails over the
hostile bidder.127
A. Revlon
In response to an unsolicited tender offer by Pantry Pride, Revlon’s board
undertook a variety of defensive measures, including a variant on a poison
pill.128 When Pantry Pride responded not by giving up on its effort to
acquire Revlon, but by increasing the price per share it was prepared to
offer, Revlon’s board responded by authorizing management to pursue
negotiations with other prospective bidders.129 The search for a white
knight culminated in an agreement between Revlon and leveraged buyout123. See id. at 488–90.
124. The point is well illustrated by the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Williams
v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996), in which an antitakeover dual class stock plan received
approval by the disinterested shareholders. In light of the shareholder action, the court held
that the Unocal standard was “inapplicable here because there was no unilateral board
action.” Id. at 1377. In other words, as with all other conflicted-interest transactions,
shareholder approval provides substantial protection from judicial review for the board’s
decision, which in turn confirms that Unocal can be situated in Delaware’s set of conflict of
interest doctrines.
125. For an argument that the conflict of interest created by resistance to an unsolicited
offer does not differ in kind from other conflicted-interest transactions, see BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 87, at 712–15.
126. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 87, at 349–51 (discussing exclusivity provisions).
127. See id. at 385–86 (discussing the use of lockup options to deter or end competitive
bidding). “In corporation law parlance, a ‘white knight’ is a friendly alternative partner who
rescues the target company from the purported clutches of a hostile bidder.” Gilbert v. El
Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1136 n.12 (Del. 1990).
128. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (1986)
(discussing Revlon’s “first relevant defensive measure . . . , which would be considered a
‘poison pill’”).
129. Id. at 182.
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specialist Forstmann Little, which included a lockup arrangement, as well
as other measures designed to prevent Pantry Pride’s bid from prevailing.130
The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed (and upheld) Revlon’s initial
defensive tactics using standard Unocal analysis.131 In turning to the
lockup arrangement, however, the court struck out in a new direction:
The Revlon board’s authorization permitting management to negotiate a
merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company
was for sale. The duty of the board had thus changed from the
preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the
company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit. This significantly
altered the board’s responsibilities under the Unocal standards. It no
longer faced threats to corporate policy and effectiveness, or to the
stockholders’ interests, from a grossly inadequate bid. The whole
question of defensive measures became moot. The directors’ role
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company.132
130. See id. at 175 (describing exclusivity terms in the Revlon-Forstmann agreement).
Broadly defined, the term “lock up” includes any agreement between a target and a
prospective acquirer intended to prevent or end competitive bidding. Bainbridge, supra note
48, at 250. More commonly, however, the term is used to refer to so-called “lock-up
options,” which consist of agreements granting a prospective acquirer an option to buy
shares or assets of the target. Id.
In Revlon, the agreement in question was a lockup option pursuant to which
Forstmann would be entitled “to purchase Revlon’s Vision Care and National Health
Laboratories divisions for $525 million, some $100–$175 million below the value ascribed
to them by Lazard Freres, if another acquiror got 40% of Revlon’s shares.” Revlon, 506 A.2d
at 178. In Revlon, the lockup’s deterrent effect thus consisted of the substantial discount
Forstmann would receive. In most cases, however, the lockup’s deterrent effect arises
because “the subject of the option is usually either the assets most desired by a competing
bidder or those essential to the target’s operations.” Bainbridge, supra note 48, at 251.
Accordingly, asset lockup options are also known as “crown jewel options,” because the
asset subject to the option is the target’s most valuable or desirable asset. Id.
Stock lockups consist of agreements by which the target gives a favored bidder an
option to purchase authorized but unissued target shares. Id. at 250. The risk that the option
will be exercised, thereby driving up the number of shares that must be acquired in order to
obtain control and thus increasing the overall acquisition cost, is intended to deter competing
bids. Id. at 250–51. In addition, if the option is exercised prior to the shareholder vote on the
merger agreement, the favored bidder can vote the additional shares in favor of the merger,
helping to assure that the requisite approval will be obtained. Id. at 251. Finally, if a
competing bidder emerges and prevails, “the favored bidder can exercise the option and sell
the additional shares on the open market or tender them to the successful bidder, thereby” at
least recouping some of the costs incurred in the losing acquisition effort. Id.
Lock-up options find use in both negotiated and hostile acquisitions. In the former
case, they are a powerful supplement to exclusive merger agreements, both deterring
competitive bidding and pressuring shareholders to approve the favored bidder transaction.
See id. at 287–89 (discussing coercive effects of lockup options). In the latter, they can be
used to end competitive bidding by locking up the deal for the favored bidder. See Revlon,
506 A.2d at 183 (noting that lock ups can “end an active auction and foreclose further
bidding”).
131. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180–81 (discussing Unocal’s application to Revlon’s initial
defensive moves).
132. Id. at 182.
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Because the lockup ended the auction in return for minimal improvement in
the final offer, it was invalidated.133
B. Initial Progeny
Thus was born the jurisprudential territory that came to be known as
Revlon-land. Finding one’s way around it proved surprisingly troublesome.
For example, did Revlon establish special duties to govern control auctions,
or are the so-called “Revlon duties” really just the general Unocal rules
applied to a special fact situation? The courts waffled on this issue,
although the latter interpretation ultimately prevailed.134
Whether the Revlon duties are distinct or just a subset of Unocal does not
address what exactly directors are supposed to do once their role changes
from “defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers.” Prior to the
pivotal Paramount decisions discussed below,135 a few things seemingly
could be said with confidence. It was clear, for example, that target
directors need not be passive observers of market competition.136 The
board’s objective, however, “must remain the enhancement of the bidding
process for the benefit of the stockholders.”137
Finally, when did directors stop being “defenders of the corporate
bastion” and become “auctioneers”? Again, prior to the Paramount
decisions, it seemed well settled that the auctioneering duty is triggered
when (but apparently only when) a proposed transaction would result in a
change of control of the target corporation. For example, if a defensive
recapitalization, which most of these cases involved, transferred effective
voting control to target management or some other identifiable control
block, the courts treated the transaction as a “change in control” of the
corporation requiring adherence to Revlon’s auction rule.138 If no
133. See id. at 183–84 (discussing the lockup’s impermissible “destructive effect on the
auction process . . . in return for very little actual improvement in the final bid”).
134. In 1987, for example, the Delaware Supreme Court drew a rather sharp distinction
between the Unocal standard and what it then called “the Revlon obligation to conduct a sale
of the corporation.” Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1338 (Del.
1987). Two years later, however, the court indicated that Revlon is “merely one of an
unbroken line of cases that seek to prevent the conflicts of interest that arise in the field of
mergers and acquisitions by demanding that directors act with scrupulous concern for
fairness to shareholders.” Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).
135. See infra Part II.C.
136. CRFT Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(applying Delaware law).
137. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989).
Directors did not need to blindly focus on price to the exclusion of other relevant factors. See
Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 577 (11th Cir. 1988). The board could
evaluate offers on such grounds as the proposed form of consideration, tax consequences,
firmness of financing, antitrust or other regulatory obstacles, and timing. Id.
138. See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1285 (holding that the requisite “sale” could
take “the form of an active auction, a management buyout, or a ‘restructuring’”); see also
Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1243 (Del. Ch. 1988); cf. Black &
Decker Corp. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772, 781 (D. Del. 1988) (reading Delaware
law to require the directors of a company to maximize the amount received by shareholders
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identifiable control block formed (or changed hands), however, defensive
measures were subject solely to standard Unocal review.139
C. Paramount Law
The evolution of the Revlon doctrine—and that of Unocal, for that
matter—took major leaps in a pair of cases involving Paramount
Communications. Taken together, they laid out a basic geography of
Revlon-land that persists to this day. They also confirm that analysis of the
board’s motives remains a critical guide to application of Revlon to specific
cases.
1. Time-Warner
In the first of these cases, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time
Inc.,140 the Delaware courts refereed a takeover struggle between Time,
Warner Communications, and Paramount. The back story to this clash of
media titans opened with Time’s board of directors approving a
management-developed long-term strategic plan to address the changing
environment facing the publishing and entertainment industries.141 The
plan included a recommendation that Time seek a business combination
with Warner Communications. Following negotiations between the two
companies’ respective managements, Time’s board of directors approved a
merger with Warner in which former Warner shareholders would receive
newly issued Time shares representing approximately 62 percent of the
shares of the combined entity. As was typical in negotiated acquisitions in
that era, the parties also sought “to discourage any effort to upset the
transaction” by agreeing to a lockup option giving each party the option to
trigger an exchange of shares.142 In addition, the merger agreement
included a no-shop clause, supplemented by commitments from various
banks that they would not finance a takeover bid for Time.143
once it is clear to them that the “corporation is to be subject to a change in control” (quoting
Freedman v. Rest. Assocs., 1987 WL 14323, at *661 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987))); Ivanhoe
Partners, 535 A.2d at 1345 (noting that Revlon was not triggered where the management ally
had less than 50 percent voting control after defensive recapitalization).
139. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880, at *22 (Del. Ch. July
14, 1989) (“Clearly not every offer or transaction affecting the corporate structure invokes
the Revlon duties.”), aff’d on other grounds, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
140. 1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
141. Time, 571 A.2d at 1144.
142. Time, 1989 WL 79880, at *9.
143. Id. at *10. No-shop clauses are merger agreement provisions intended to discourage
competitive bids for the target from other offerors by prohibiting the target from soliciting
any such competing offer. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 350 (describing such clauses).
Basic no-shop clauses do, however, permit the target’s board of directors to consider an
unsolicited bid and, if such an unsolicited offer is made, to negotiate with the new bidder.
See id. (discussing relevant provisions). In contrast, a no negotiation covenant prohibits the
target from entering into negotiations with a competing bidder making an unsolicited offer.
See id. (discussing relevant provisions). An intermediary variant, the no-merger clause,
permits the target to negotiate with a prospective competing offeror, but prohibits it from
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Shortly before Time’s shareholders were to vote on the merger plan,
Paramount made a cash tender offer of $175 per share for Time,
conditioned, inter alia, on termination of the Time-Warner merger
agreement.144 Time’s board rejected the offer as inadequate, without
entering into communications with Paramount.145 To forestall Paramount
from going forward with a hostile tender offer, the Time and Warner boards
then agreed to a new structure for the transaction, under which Time would
make a cash tender offer for a majority block of Warner shares to be
followed by a freeze-out merger in which the remaining Warner shares
would be acquired.146 This structure had the advantage of eliminating any
need for approval of the transaction by Time’s shareholders, which was
deemed essential because a substantial majority of Time’s shares were now
held by arbitragers and institutional investors considered likely to favor the
Paramount offer and who were therefore expected to vote against the
merger with Warner if given the opportunity to do so.147 If the revised plan
succeeded, Time’s shareholders therefore would end up as minority
shareholders in a company saddled with substantial debt and whose stock
price almost certainly would be lower in the short run than the Paramount
offer.148
a. Why Not Let the Shareholders Decide?
The substantial differences in shareholder wealth likely to result from a
decision to merge with Warner rather than to sell to Paramount forcefully
presented the question of who should make that decision.149 Paramount
naturally insisted that Time’s board had an obligation to give the
“shareholders the power and opportunity to designate whether the company
should now be sold.”150 Chancellor Allen, however, squarely rejected that
proposition, holding that “the financial vitality of the corporation and the
value of the company’s shares is in the hands of the directors and managers

entering into a merger agreement with the second bidder until the initial bid has been voted
on by the target’s shareholders. See id. (discussing relevant provisions).
144. Time, 1989 WL 79880, at *10.
145. See id. at *11 (describing the reaction of Time’s board). The no-shop clause in the
Time-Warner merger agreement contained an exception permitting Time to “communicate”
with a competing offeror, after consultation with Warner, in the event “a hostile tender offer
for 25% or more of Time’s stock [was] announced (or 10% of its stock [was] purchased).”).
Id.
146. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1148 (describing the terms of the revised deal).
147. See Time, 1989 WL 79880, at *14 (noting that “most such money managers would
be tempted by the cash now”).
148. Among other things, the new plan required Time to incur between seven and ten
billion dollars in additional debt. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1148 (describing the effects of the
revised deal).
149. As Chancellor Allen put it, the “overarching question is where legally (an easy
question) and equitably (more subtle problem) the locus of decision-making power does or
should reside in circumstances of this kind.” Time, 1989 WL 79880, at *20.
150. Id.
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of the firm.”151 Accordingly, Allen squarely rejected the argument “that
directors, in exercising their powers to manage the firm, are obligated to
follow the wishes of a majority of shares.”152 The Delaware Supreme
Court explicitly endorsed Allen’s analysis.153
Time thus implicitly rejects the argument that a shareholder’s decision to
tender his shares to the bidder no more concerns the institutional
responsibilities or prerogatives of the board than would the shareholder’s
decision to sell his shares on the open market or, for that matter, to sell his
house.154 Time was correct to do so, because none of the normative bases
for the contrary argument prove persuasive. That shareholders have the
right to make the final decision about an unsolicited tender offer does not
necessarily follow, for example, from the mere fact that shareholders have
voting rights.155
Likewise, a right for shareholders to choose between competing offers is
not a necessary corollary of the shareholders’ ownership of the corporation.
A shareholder’s right to dispose of his stock is not a species of private
property, but rather arises out of the contract established by the firm’s
organic documents and the state of incorporation’s corporate statute and
common law.156 As Vice Chancellor Walsh observed of that contract,
“shareholders do not possess a contractual right to receive takeover bids.
The shareholders’ ability to gain premiums through takeover activity is
subject to the good faith business judgment of the board of directors in
structuring defensive tactics.”157
b. The Emergence of Motive As the Determinative Factor
Because shareholder choice has little independent normative significance,
if any, the real question was whether the Time board’s foreclosing of
shareholder choice was based on proper or improper motives. In other
151. Id. at *30.
152. Id.
153. Time, 571 A.2d at 1153–54 (explaining that courts should not substitute their
judgment for that of the board).
154. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1986)
(advancing that argument), rev’d on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Hanson Trust PLC
v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 282 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984) (same).
155. See TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 1989 WL 20290, at *8 n.14 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (“While corporate democracy is a pertinent concept, a corporation is not a
New England town meeting; directors, not shareholders, have responsibilities to manage the
business and affairs of the corporation, subject however to a fiduciary obligation.”).
156. See, e.g., New Orleans Opera Ass’n v. S. Reg’l Opera Endowment Fund, 993 So. 2d
791, 797–98 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“A corporate charter or articles of incorporation are a
contract between the corporation and its shareholders and forms a contractual relationship
between the shareholders themselves, which sets forth rights, obligations and liabilities . . . .
A corporation is in law a contractual creature, a nexus of contracts.” (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
157. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985).
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words, did the board exercise its prerogative in ways suggesting that the
transaction was driven by management self-interest? This is so because it
had become increasingly clear that the Delaware courts were—albeit sub
silentio—varying the standard of review according to the likelihood that the
actions of the board or managers were tainted by conflicted interests in a
particular transactional setting and the likelihood that nonlegal forces
effectively constrained those conflicted interests in that setting. In other
words, the target board’s motives had emerged as a crucial—if not
determinative—factor in the analysis.158
As former Delaware Chancellor Allen explained in the closely related
context of management buyout transactions, “The court’s own implicit
evaluation of the integrity of the . . . process marks that process as
deserving respect or condemns it to be ignored.”159 Assuming that a special
committee of independent directors would be appointed to consider the
proposed transaction, Allen went on to explain:
When a special committee’s process is perceived as reflecting a good
faith, informed attempt to approximate aggressive, arms-length
bargaining, it will be accorded substantial importance by the court.
When, on the other hand, it appears as artifice, ruse or charade, or when
the board unduly limits the committee or when the committee fails to
correctly perceive its mission—then one can expect that its decision will
be accorded no respect.160

There is considerable evidence that the same emphasis on conflicted
interests and motives underlies much of the Unocal and Revlon analysis.
Former Delaware Supreme Court Justice Moore argued, for example, that
during his tenure on the court he and his colleagues focused on the question
of “whether the directors acted properly in accepting or rejecting the
competing offers,” even if hindsight demonstrated that that decision turned
out “to be wrong.”161 A federal court similarly described the Unocal
standard as asking “whether a fully informed, wholly disinterested,
reasonably courageous director would dissent from the board’s act in any
material part.”162
Motive is the consistent theme throughout these summations of Delaware
law. Accordingly, in many cases it appeared that, if the conflict of interest
inherent in target board actions in cases governed by those standards had
matured into actual self-dealing, the court would invalidate the defensive

158. See generally Dooley, supra note 6, at 517–24 (discussing the significance of board
motives in Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence).
159. William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or
Fantasy?, 45 BUS. LAW. 2055, 2060 (1990).
160. Id.
161. Andrew G.T. Moore, II, The 1980s—Did We Save the Stockholders While the
Corporation Burned?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 277, 287–89 (1992).
162. Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Res., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 595, 602 (S.D. Tex.
1988).
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tactics. If the board acted from proper motives, even if mistakenly,
however, the court would leave the defenses in place.163
We see a similar emphasis on motive in cases involving corporate control
auctions subject to Revlon. As the Eleventh Circuit has noted, all corporate
control “auctions must end sometime, and lockups by definition must
discourage other bidders.”164 In assessing the validity of lockups and
related devices, the proper questions thus are “whether [the target]
conducted a fair auction, and whether [the favored bidder] made the best
offer.”165 If those questions can be answered in the affirmative, the court
has objective evidence that the board acted from proper motives even
though its actions effectively precluded anyone other than the favored
bidder from acquiring the company.166
c. How Time Policed the Board’s Conflict of Interest
Time’s initial decision to merge with Warner was made by a board
comprised principally of outsiders with no readily apparent conflicts of
interest. Once the Paramount bid emerged, however, the directors
163. See, for example, Henley Group, Inc. v. Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp., 1988 WL
23945 (Del. Ch. Apr. 12, 1988), in which the defendant corporation adopted a poison debt
plan pursuant to which pay-in-kind debentures were distributed to the company’s
shareholders as part of a restructuring. Id. at *6. A variety of antitakeover provisions were
built into the debentures, making the company a much less attractive takeover candidate. See
id. at *7 (summarizing the plaintiff’s allegations). Vice Chancellor Jacobs, however,
deemed the debentures to be valid under Unocal. See id. at 14–16 (discussing Unocal
issues). The Vice Chancellor’s conclusion was driven in large part by the board of directors’
“diligent efforts” to sell the company prior to embarking upon the restructuring. Id. at 14.
Those efforts “deprive[d] the plaintiffs’ argument—that the defendants were motivated to
entrench themselves—of its force.” Id.
Other examples of the outcome-determinative nature of motive include: Gilbert v.
El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1146 (Del. 1990) (upholding the settlement of a hostile
takeover contest because “there is not a scintilla of evidence to intimate that this arrangement
was the result of improper motives” on the board’s part); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont
Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (upholding defensive tactics because the
“board acted to maintain the company’s independence and not merely to preserve its own
control”); Henley Grp., Inc. v. Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., 1988 WL 23945 (Del. Ch. Apr. 12,
1988) (upholding a corporate restructuring where the board’s “diligent efforts” to sell the
company before embarking on the restructuring “deprive[d] the plaintiffs’ argument—that
the defendants were motivated to entrench themselves—of its force.”); Freedman v. Rest.
Assocs. Indus., [1987–1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 93,502 (Del. Ch.
1987) (holding that a board committee’s handling of a management-led leveraged buyout
proposal would be reviewed under the business judgment rule because the plaintiffs had
“failed utterly to offer any legal justification for the court’s second-guessing the decision of
the special committee.”).
164. Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 576 (11th Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted).
165. Id.
166. Indeed, Revlon itself can be seen as a case in which the board’s actions strongly
suggest self-interest. Why would an auctioneer approve a transaction other than the highest
bid if not for improper motives, at least assuming the competing proposals are identical in all
respects other than price? In fact, it appears that Revlon’s directors were mainly concerned
with protecting themselves from litigation by the company’s debt holders. See Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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undertook a drastic course of action whose sole purpose was preventing
their shareholders from accepting Paramount’s offer. As suggested by the
analysis in the preceding section, this attempt to foreclose shareholder
choice without first conducting a fair competition for control posed
heightened accountability concerns because it provides circumstantial
evidence from which one might reasonably infer the presence of selfinterested decision making.
Consistent with the analysis offered in the preceding section, the Time
courts chose differing standards of review reflecting the differing conflicts
posed by the various challenged board actions. The Time board’s initial
decision to merge with Warner was protected by the business judgment
rule.167 In contrast, the lockup, the decision to recast the transaction as a
tender offer for Warner, and the various other measures undertaken to stave
off Paramount’s competing bid involved a conflict of interest sufficiently
severe to require application of a more exacting standard of review.168 The
preliminary question, however, was whether Unocal or Revlon provided the
applicable standard.
d. Time and Paramount Meet in Revlon-land
For somewhat different reasons both Chancellor Allen and the Delaware
Supreme Court concluded that Revlon had been not triggered. Chancellor
Allen followed a line of chancery court cases holding that Revlon applied to
any transaction constituting a change in control,169 but he determined that
the Time-Warner merger agreement would not result in a transfer of control
because control of the combined entity remained “in a large, fluid,
changeable and changing market.”170
Although the Delaware Supreme Court indicated Allen’s analysis was
correct “as a matter of law,” it rejected plaintiff’s Revlon claims on
“different grounds”171:
Under Delaware law there are, generally speaking and without
excluding other possibilities, two circumstances which may implicate
Revlon duties. The first, and clearer one, is when a corporation initiates
an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business
reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company. However,
Revlon duties may also be triggered where, in response to a bidder’s offer,
a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative
transaction involving the breakup of the company.172

167. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1989).
168. See id. at 1152 (noting that “the revised agreement was defense-motivated”).
169. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text (discussing relevant precedents).
The analysis in this section borrows in part from BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 393–400.
170. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 14,
1989).
171. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150.
172. Id.
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This passage is not a model of clarity. What are the other nonexcluded
possibilities? How do the first and second identified possibilities differ? If
the court was deciding the case on broader grounds than Allen, can change
of control transactions not involving a breakup of the company still trigger
Revlon? In particular, does Revlon apply when the target “initiates an
active auction process seeking to sell itself,” but the auction participants do
not contemplate breaking up the company? Indeed, what exactly does the
court mean by a “breakup of the company”? What does seem clear,
however, is that the Delaware Supreme Court intended to ensure that
Revlon did not swallow the field of takeover litigation.173
To be sure, Time did not leave the lockup and other bid-preclusive
measures immune from challenge. Instead, the lockup and Time’s
subsequent recasting of the acquisition as a tender offer were defensive
measures to be analyzed under Unocal.174 The courts’ refusal to apply the
business judgment rule to these deal protective devices was perfectly proper
given the conflict of interest inherent when target managers use them to tip
the outcome of a takeover contest to one bidder over another, at least before
there has been a fair competition between the two bidders to elicit the best
price for the shareholders.175
e. Did the Time Opinion Adequately Respond to
a Target Board’s Conflict of Interest?
In many of the pre-Time chancery court cases upon which Chancellor
Allen had relied, the competing bid was created internally by the target’s
managers rather than being made by an outside white knight.176 In these
cases, the target’s board typically created or refused to redeem an existing
poison pill. While the hostile bidder was delayed by the pill, the target’s
board approved a defensive restructuring intended to give management
effective voting control or to otherwise make the target unpalatable to
potential bidders.
In a common scenario, the target paid a dividend to its shareholders
consisting of cash (often borrowed) and debt securities, which had the effect
of reducing the post-dividend value of the target’s stock to the extent of the
distribution. In some cases, the transaction also was structured so that
173. See generally Marc I. Steinberg, Nightmare on Main Street: The Paramount Picture
Horror Show, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 15 (1991) (arguing that the Delaware Supreme Court’s
Time opinion “narrowly constru[ed] Revlon’s scope”); Charles Yablon, Overcompensating:
The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1869 (1992) (arguing
that “doctrinally, Time was about delimiting the appropriate scope of the Unocal and Revlon
standards”).
174. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1152 (affirming the chancery court’s ruling “that Unocal
applied to all [Time] director actions taken, following receipt of Paramount’s hostile tender
offer, that were reasonably determined to be defensive”).
175. For an analysis of the Delaware Supreme Court’s application of the Unocal standard
in Time, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 397–400.
176. The description and analysis of these cases in this section borrows from id. at 399–
400.
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target managers or the target’s employee stock ownership plan effectively
received the dividend in the form of target common stock at an exchange
rate based on the stock’s post-dividend value.177 Alternatively, the target
might conduct a tender offer in which public shareholders exchange their
stock for cash and debt.178 In either case, management’s equity interest in
the corporation increased substantially relative to that of the public
shareholders, creating a formidable barrier for any post-transaction hostile
bidder.
In contrast, as Chancellor Allen emphasized, nothing Time’s board of
directors did created any obstacle for a post-transaction bidder defensive
action other than the postmerger combined Time-Warner entity’s great
size.179 So long as a hostile bidder had sufficiently deep pockets and a
large enough debt capacity, nothing precluded such a bidder from buying
the combined Time-Warner corporation and, if so desired, spinning or
Accordingly, the Time-Warner
selling off unwanted divisions.180
transaction was more akin to a repeat game than a final period one and, as
such, the target board’s conflict of interest was constrained by the market
for corporate control in ways that had not been true of the defensive
restructuring cases.
Another important distinction between Time and the earlier cases was
that Time’s board was motivated throughout by a desire to advance
legitimate corporate interests. In effect, Paramount was asking the
Delaware courts to block Time’s board from continuing to operate the
corporation’s business and affairs during the pendency of the takeover bid.
The Delaware courts were properly reluctant to do so, as a hostile bidder
has no right to expect the incumbent board of directors to stop an ongoing
business strategy in midstream.
In sum, Time presented a highly unusual set of facts, which rebutted the
inference that the board acted from improper motives and rendered the
result—if not the reasoning—in that particular case relatively
unobjectionable. Many fruitful avenues for limiting Time’s reasoning thus
presented themselves. The question was whether the Delaware Supreme
Court would avail itself of those options or would continue down the road
of retreat Time’s reasoning appeared to mark out.

177. E.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772, 776–77 (D.
Del. 1988); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987);
Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1236–37 (Del. Ch. 1988).
178. E.g., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch.
1986).
179. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880, at *22 (Del. Ch. July
14, 1989) (“The merged Time-Warner company would be large, it is true . . . , but recent
history has shown that huge transactions can be done.”).
180. See id. (noting that, “if a leveraged acquisition of both participants was feasible
before the merger, one cannot say that a stock for stock consolidation of such firms would
necessarily preclude an acquisition of it thereafter, or so defendants contend”).
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2. QVC
Some five years later, the Delaware Supreme Court revisited the issues
posed in its Time opinion in a major decision that, oddly enough, also
involved Paramount Communications.181 Paramount agreed to merge with
Viacom, a major media conglomerate whose CEO and controlling
shareholder was Sumner Redstone. In order to discourage competitive bids,
the companies included a number of exclusivity provisions in the agreement
and plan of merger. A no-shop clause precluded Paramount’s board from
discussing a potential business combination with a third party unless the
third party could show that its proposal was not subject to financial
contingencies, and the Paramount board determined that its fiduciary duties
obliged it to enter negotiations with the third party.182 A termination fee
obligated Paramount to pay Viacom $100 million if “(a) Paramount
terminated the Original Merger Agreement because of a competing
transaction; (b) Paramount’s stockholders did not approve the merger; or
(c) the Paramount Board recommended a competing transaction.”183 In
addition to the agreement and plan of merger, Viacom and Paramount also
entered into a stock lockup option, under which, if the Viacom deal fell
through for any reason that triggered the termination fee, Viacom would be
able to purchase shares representing approximately 20 percent of
Paramount’s outstanding common stock.184 As the court explained, the
agreement also “contained two provisions that were both unusual and
highly beneficial to Viacom.”185 First, Viacom could pay for the shares
using a senior subordinated note of questionable marketability instead of
cash. Second, in lieu of exercising the option, Viacom could elect to
require Paramount to pay Viacom in cash a sum equal to the difference
181. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). The
analysis in this section borrows in part from BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 400–03.
182. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 39 (describing the no-shop clause).
183. Id. Provisions for monetary compensation of the favored bidder in the event the
transaction fails to go forward long have been common in negotiated acquisitions. E.g.,
Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 578 (11th Cir. 1988); Beebe v. Pac. Realty
Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1150 n.7 (D. Or. 1984). Termination fees, such as those at issue in
QVC, are essentially liquidated damages payable if the acquirer fails to receive the expected
benefits of its agreement. The fee ordinarily falls in a range of 1 to 5 percent of the proposed
acquisition price. See St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 536 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995) (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-ups in
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 246 (1991)). Payment of the fee
is commonly triggered by the acquisition of a specified amount of target stock by a third
party. E.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 269 (2d Cir.
1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178 (Del.
1986). Variants include termination of the merger agreement by the target or shareholder
rejection of the acquisition proposal. E.g., Cottle, 849 F.2d at 572; Beebe, 578 F. Supp. at
1150. White knights proposing a leveraged buyout of the target in response to a hostile
takeover bid may also require an engagement fee, requiring the target to pay a relatively
small fee as consideration for the white knight’s preparation and submission of its bid. E.g.,
Cottle, 849 F.2d at 572; Hanson Trust PLC, 781 F.2d at 269.
184. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 39 (describing the agreement).
185. Id.
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between the strike price in the option and the market price of Paramount’s
stock.186 The potential value of the option to Viacom was uncapped and
eventually “increased to nearly $500 million.”187
Despite the obstacles created by these defenses, QVC made a competing
offer for Paramount.188 Going forward from this point, the takeover fight
was further complicated by the intrusion of Hollywood egos. Paramount
CEO Davis Martin had once fired QVC’s CEO and major shareholder,
Barry Diller, and the two apparently hated each other.189
Following several rounds of bidding, Paramount’s board announced that
it would recommend acceptance of the Viacom proposal and would
continue to resist QVC’s offer.190 In response, QVC brought suit seeking to
enjoin Paramount’s defensive efforts to protect the Viacom deal.
Paramount relied on Time to argue that its defensive actions had not
triggered Revlon. Because Paramount had neither initiated an active
bidding process nor approved a breakup of the company, this was not an
implausible argument.191 The facts of QVC thus highlighted the potential
doctrinal mischief done by Time. Assuming that Revlon had not been
triggered, the issue would be whether Paramount’s defensive actions could
be sustained under a Unocal-style analysis. A successful ParamountViacom merger would not have legally precluded QVC from attempting to
purchase the combined Viacom-Paramount entity. Accordingly, there was
a strong argument that Paramount’s actions should pass muster under
Time’s reading of Unocal.192 But while nothing Paramount had done
created a legal obstacle to a QVC bid for the postmerger combined Viacom186. Id.
187. Id. at 40 n.5.
188. See id. at 39–40 (discussing QVC’s initial competing bid).
189. See John Greenwald, The Deal That Forced Diller To Fold, TIME, Feb. 28, 1994, at
50, 51 (describing the Diller-Davis feud). Edward Rock points out that the ego clash meant
that QVC implicated accountability concerns in a way that Time had not:
In Time-Warner, fully informed directors acted deliberately pursuant to a wellthought-out long-term plan. Along comes Paramount, which tries to stop the Time
board. In response, the directors reject Paramount’s efforts and determine to
continue their long-term plan. In Viacom, a strong-willed CEO misleads the
board, keeps crucial information from them, prevents them from discussing the
terms of the bid with Barry Diller, and structures the transaction so that QVC is at
a serious disadvantage because of personal antipathy for Diller. From this
perspective, the cases are completely consistent with Delaware norms. Strongwilled CEOs who dominate directors are disfavored. Allowing personal antipathy
for a bidder to interfere with the board’s serious consideration of the bid is wrong.
Tilting the playing field towards management’s preferred bidder immediately
raises questions.
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1081 (1997) (footnotes omitted). As he aptly summarizes, “The
principal difference between the two cases is that the managers and board behaved well in
Time-Warner and badly in QVC.” Id. at 1086.
190. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 40–41 (describing the bidding process).
191. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (quoting Time’s discussion of Revlon
triggers).
192. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of how,
in Time, a bid for the combined entity was not precluded).
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Paramount entity, QVC—and any other bidder—would face an
insurmountable practical barrier in the form of Sumner Redstone. As
controlling shareholder of Viacom, Redstone would have controlled the
combined Paramount-Viacom entity.193
The presence of a controlling shareholder substantially changes the
conflict of interest mix. In an acquisition of one publicly held corporation
by another public corporation, diversified shareholders should be indifferent
as to the allocations of gains between the two corporate entities. To
understand why that is the case, begin by assuming that the typical
acquisition generates gains equal to 50 percent of the target’s pre-offer
market price. Fully diversified investors are as likely to own acquiring
company shares as target shares; indeed, they may own shares in both
corporate entities.194 Because increasing the target’s share of the gains by
increasing the premium the acquirer pays to obtain control necessarily
reduces the acquirer’s share, the diversified investor will view such a shift
as simply robbing Peter to pay Paul.195 Indeed, if changing the gain
allocation between the two raises total transaction costs, such changes leave
fully diversified investors worse off, because expenditures devoted to
shifting the gain allocation between the parties amount to a tax on investors
in favor of outsider advisors such as lawyers, investment bankers, and
others.196
If the acquiring entity is privately held, however, even a fully diversified
investor can never be on both sides of the transaction. If the intermediate
case in which the acquiring entity is publicly held, but is controlled by a
single shareholder, as in QVC, a fully diversified investor likely will not
share pro rata in the gains reaped by the acquiring company because the
large shareholder’s control enables it to reap a non–pro rata share of any
such gains.197 Accordingly, in the QVC situation, diversified investors
193. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 43 (noting that after the merger “there will be a controlling
stockholder,” referring to Redstone).
194. See Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV.
129, 154 (2009) (“When the shareholder census consists of diversified investors such as
institutional shareholders, these investors may well own shares in companies on both sides of
the deal . . . .”).
195. See In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1021 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(“For diversified investors as likely to own the shares of an acquiror as a target, it is often the
case that the premium paid in an M & A deal goes from one pocket to another.”); cf. William
T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual
Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1077 (2002) (arguing that, for investors holding diversified
portfolios, gains from holding target company stock are likely to be offset by losses from
holding acquirer stock).
196. Professor Bernard Black argues that “apart from transaction costs, overpayment [by
takeover acquirers] does not cause losses to diversified investors because such investors are
indifferent to whether the bidder pays excess cash to its own or to the target’s shareholders,”
thereby simultaneously acknowledging and downplaying the role of transaction costs.
Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 649 (1989).
197. Cf. Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2002) (noting that a controlling
shareholder’s “general ability to reap a share of corporate benefits in excess of a pro rata
share”).

2013]

THE GEOGRAPHY OF REVLON-LAND

3311

should not be indifferent to how the gain is allocated between target and
acquirer. Instead, such investors should prefer that as much of the gain as
possible be allocated to the target.198
Unfortunately, there is good reason to suspect that target directors and
managers will favor the privately held acquirer’s interests over those of the
target shareholders. The controlling shareholder’s ability to reap a
disproportionate share of post-transaction gains, for example, gives it an
unusually high incentive to cause the acquiring entity to offer side payments
to target directors and managers in order to obtain their cooperation. In
turn, the controlling shareholder’s de facto ability to block acquisition
proposals for the postmerger combined entity insulates that conflict of
interest from the constraining influence of the market for corporate
control.199 As a result, the conflict of interest inherent in any corporate
control auction is substantially magnified in the QVC situation. In addition,
of course, the facts of that case presented a unique conflict due to the
clashing Hollywood egos at play.200
The QVC court demonstrated its sensitivity to this concern by holding
that the Paramount board’s conduct was subject to enhanced judicial
scrutiny:
Such scrutiny is mandated by: (a) the threatened diminution of the
current stockholders’ voting power; (b) the fact that an asset belonging to
public stockholders (a control premium) is being sold and may never be
available again; and (c) the traditional concern of Delaware courts for
actions which impair or impede stockholder voting rights.201

As Dooley observes, the factors the court identified seem incongruous,
because they have little to do with the conflicted interest focus of Unocal
and Revlon.202 As applied to the specific facts of QVC, however, references
to the shareholders’ interest in the control premium presumably reflect the
possibility that conflicted interests on the part of Paramount’s directors
would lead them to take actions that transferred gains from their
shareholders to Viacom and Redstone.203
198. Cf. DOOLEY, supra note 25, at 577 (noting that the QVC court expressed concern that
“voting control is generally achieved only at the price of paying a ‘premium’ to the minority
shareholders for the loss of their voting influence (fluid and dispersed though it is), and that
public shareholders lose the expectation of receiving any such premium once control has
been transferred to and consolidated in a majority shareholder”).
199. Cf. Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 844–45 (Del. 1987) (holding
that a target company’s controlling shareholder has no duty to sell his shares to a prospective
acquirer, even if an acquisition would benefit the minority shareholders).
200. See supra note 189 (discussing the clash of egos).
201. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (emphasis added).
202. DOOLEY, supra note 25, at 577.
203. The same concern seems to underlie then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs’s observation that
the shareholders’ continuing equity interest is far from secure, because once the
Viacom transaction is complete Mr. Redstone will have absolute control of the
merged entity and will have the power to use his control at any time to eliminate
the shareholders’ interest by a “cash out” merger. In this case the board did not
obtain, or even bargain for, structural protections that would ensure the continuity
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In QVC, the Delaware Supreme Court did not overrule Time, but did
limit Time to its unique facts, thereby seemingly recognizing—albeit sub
silentio—the doctrinal limitations Time imposed on the Delaware courts’
ability to police target directors’ and managers’ conflicted interests. Recall
that the critical passage in Time was the claim that, “[u]nder Delaware law
there are, generally speaking and without excluding other possibilities, two
circumstances which may implicate Revlon duties,” which were initiation of
an active bidding process and approval of a breakup of the company.204 In
QVC, the court seized upon the qualifying phrase “without excluding other
possibilities.”205 In this case, the court opined, one of the other possibilities
was present—namely, a change of control.206 Accordingly, Revlon was
triggered.207
By thus rehabilitating Chancellor Allen’s Time opinion, which the court
went out of its way to describe as “well-reasoned,”208 and by resurrecting
the change of control test, QVC specifically addressed the potential for
conflicted interests on the part of directors in transactions like the one at
hand. In addition to rewriting Time’s narrow interpretation of Revlon, the
QVC decision introduced a subtle but highly significant doctrinal shift.
While Time had treated Unocal and Revlon as separate standards of review,
QVC restored the pre-Time view that they are part of a single line of cases
in which the significant conflict of interest found in certain control
transactions justified enhanced judicial scrutiny.209
Likewise, while Time had emphasized the formal tests announced in
Unocal and Revlon, the QVC court struck out in a less rigid direction. As
described by QVC, the enhanced scrutiny test is basically a reasonableness
inquiry to be applied on a case-by-case basis. This inquiry has two key
features. First, the court must determine whether the directors had followed
an adequate decision-making process in gathering information and

of Paramount’s current shareholders (or their successors) in any merged enterprise.
Absent such protection, these shareholders can have no assurance that they will
receive the long-run benefits claimed to justify the board’s decision to prefer
Viacom over QVC. This is the only opportunity that Paramount’s shareholders
will ever have to receive the highest available premium-conferring transaction.
For this reason as well, fairness requires that the shareholders be afforded the
fiduciary protections mandated by Revlon and Unocal.
QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Commc’ns Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1266–67 (Del. Ch. 1993)
(footnote omitted), aff’d, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
204. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989)
(emphasis added).
205. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46–48 (Del. 1994).
206. Id. at 48.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 47.
209. See id. at 46 (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del.
1989), for the proposition that “the general principles announced in Revlon, in Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., and in Moran v. Household International, Inc. govern this case and
every case in which a fundamental change of corporate control occurs or is contemplated”
(emphasis removed) (citations omitted).
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evaluating the need for takeover defenses.210 Second, the court must
determine that the directors’ decisions were reasonable under the
circumstances.211 The directors have the burden of proof on both aspects of
the inquiry, although the directors need not prove that they made the right
decision, but merely that their decision fell within the range of
reasonableness.212
The reasonableness standard was the logical culmination of the case law
evolution toward using the Unocal and Revlon standards as a sieve for
conflicted interests. Notice that the reasonableness test parallels the
definition of fairness used in the former Model Business Corporation Act
provisions governing interested director transactions, namely, whether the
transaction in question falls “within the range that might have been entered
into at arms-length by disinterested persons.”213 Both standards ferret out
board actions motivated by conflicted interests by contrasting the decision
at hand to some objective standard. The assumption seems to be that a
reasonable decision is unlikely to be motivated by conflicted interest or, at
least, that improper motives are irrelevant so long as the resulting decision
falls within a range of reasonable outcomes. Put another way, the
animating principle behind both standards seems to be “no harm, no foul,”
which seems sensible enough.
D. Summation
In sum, the search for conflicted interests reflects the Delaware courts’
solution to the irreconcilable tension between authority and accountability.
Concern for accountability drives the courts’ expectation that the board will
function as a separate institution independent from and superior to the
firm’s managers. The court will inquire closely into the role actually played
by the board, especially the outside directors, the extent to which they were
supplied with all relevant information and independent advisors, and the
extent to which they were insulated from management influence. Only if
the directors had the ultimate decision-making authority, rather than
incumbent management, will the board’s conduct pass muster. But if it
does, respect-for-authority values will require the court to defer to the
board’s substantive decisions. The board has legitimate authority in the
takeover context, just as it has in proxy contests and a host of other
decisions that nominally appear to belong to the shareholders. Nor can the
board’s authority be restricted in this context without impinging on the
board’s authority elsewhere. Authority thus cannot be avoided any more
210. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45.
211. Id.
212. See id. (holding that “a court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding
whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision”). QVC also
strongly indicated that a court should not second-guess a board decision that falls within the
range of reasonableness, “even though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events
may have cast doubt on the board’s determination.” Id.
213. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.31 cmt. 4 (1984).
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than can accountability; the task is to come up with a reasonable balance.
Properly interpreted, that is precisely what the Delaware cases have done.
III. A MAP OF REVLON-LAND POST-QVC
Any effort to map Revlon-land requires resolution of two critical
questions. First, when do directors stop being “defenders of the corporate
bastion” and become “auctioneers”? Second, what are the directors’
obligations once their role shifts?
A. Revlon-Land’s Borders
Shortly after deciding QVC, the Delaware Supreme Court settled on a
three-pronged standard for determining whether Revlon had come into play:
The directors of a corporation have the obligation of acting reasonably
to seek the transaction offering the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders in at least the following three scenarios: (1) when a
corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to
effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the
company; (2) where, in response to a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its
long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the
break-up of the company; or (3) when approval of a transaction results in
a sale or change of control. In the latter situation, there is no sale or
change in control when [c]ontrol of both [companies] remain[s] in a large,
fluid, changeable and changing market.214

Outside those three situations, which do not even encompass all corporate
control auctions, Unocal remains the defining standard, as the court
elsewhere emphasized by flipping the Revlon metaphor around to hold that
“[w]hen a corporation is not for sale, the board of directors is the defender
of the metaphorical medieval corporate bastion and the protector of the
corporation’s shareholders.”215 Accordingly, outside Revlon-land, a target
board may respond defensively to a bidder “at the corporate bastion’s
gate.”216
B. Directors’ Duties in Revlon-land
Although the court continued to identify a limited class of cases in which
Revlon was the controlling precedent, it also continued to confirm QVC’s
holding that Revlon is properly understood as a mere variant of Unocal
214. Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289–90 (Del. 1994)
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
215. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995). In Unitrin, the
target’s board had adopted a poison pill, amended the bylaws to add additional defenses, and
initiated a defensive stock repurchase. The chancery court found the latter “unnecessary” in
light of the poison pill, but the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 1367. The Supreme Court
held that “draconian” defenses (i.e., those that are “coercive or preclusive”) are invalid per
se. Id. at 1387. Defenses that are not preclusive or coercive, however, are to be reviewed
under QVC’s “range of reasonableness” standard. Id. at 1387–88.
216. Id. at 1388.
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rather than as a separate doctrine.217 Having said that, however, application
of the reasonableness standard does differ somewhat in cases falling within
the borders of Revlon-land than in those governed by Unocal. As the
Delaware Chancery Court has observed, this is so because in the former a
court must assess “a director’s performance of his or her duties of care,
good faith and loyalty in the unique factual circumstance of a sale of control
over the corporate enterprise.”218 Accordingly, what is reasonable under
Unocal may not be reasonable in Revlon-land.
1. Consideration of Nonshareholder Interests
The clearest example of how Revlon duties differ from those imposed by
Unocal is the proper role, if any, of director concerns for corporate
stakeholders other than shareholders. In Unocal settings, the target’s board
may consider “the impact [of the bid] on ‘constituencies’ other than
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the
community generally)” in whether the bid posed a cognizable threat.219 In
Revlon-land, by contrast, directors may not consider any interest other than
shareholder wealth maximization.220
2. Discrimination and Favoritism
Many takeover defenses that pass muster under the Unocal standard
involve discrimination between the bidder and other shareholders. The
stock repurchase at issue in Unocal itself excluded Mesa from
participation.221 In contrast, once Revlon triggers, the target’s board of
directors loses most of its power to discriminate between bidders and to
favor one outcome of the takeover fight over another. To be sure, while it
is true that the board must take an “active and direct role in the sale
process,”222 “there is no single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill
its [Revlon] duties.”223 Even so, however, the board’s goal must be “to
secure the highest value reasonably attainable for the stockholders.”224

217. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Commc’ns Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1267 (Del. Ch.
1993) (“The basic teaching of Revlon and Unocal ‘is simply that the directors must act in
accordance with their fundamental duties of care and loyalty.’”), aff’d, 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1994).
218. In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 731 (Del. Ch. 1999).
219. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
220. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
221. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953–54 (holding that “a Delaware corporation may deal
selectively with its stockholders, provided the directors have not acted out of a sole or
primary purpose to entrench themselves in office”).
222. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989).
223. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).
224. McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 502 (Del. Ch. 2000). But “[n]o court
can tell directors exactly how to accomplish that goal, because they will be facing a unique
combination of circumstances, many of which will be outside their control.” Lyondell Chem.
Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009).
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Favoritism toward one bidder over the other therefore has been treated as
highly suspect. Although “[f]avoritism for a white knight to the total
exclusion of a hostile bidder might be justifiable when the latter’s offer
adversely affects shareholder interests,” the Delaware courts have made
clear that “the directors cannot fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by
playing favorites with the contending factions.”225
What does this mean for the use of lockup options and other exclusivity
provisions in Revlon-land? In Macmillan, the Delaware Supreme Court
distinguished between lockups that draw an otherwise unwilling bidder into
the contest and those that end an active auction by effectively foreclosing
further bidding.226 While neither type is per se unlawful, the latter is
subject to exacting judicial scrutiny.227 Where the target obtains only a
minimal increase in the final bid in return for an auction-ending lockup, the
agreement is unlikely to pass muster.228
Of course, this distinction makes no practical sense. Suppose a
prospective white knight tells the target’s board that it will not bid unless
the board grants the bidder a lockup amounting to 10 percent of the target’s
outstanding shares. In response, the initial bidder says that it will walk if
the lockup is granted. If both parties are credible, the lockup will
simultaneously induce an unwilling bid and end the auction process.
Accordingly, while the inducement versus end dichotomy
has the virtue of appearing to encourage a desirable end—competitive
bidding in acquisition transactions—it is not particularly helpful in
determining the validity of any particular option because all lock-up
options, by their nature, encourage the bid of the person receiving the
lock-up and discourage the bids of all other persons.229

The Eleventh Circuit cut through the confusion in Cottle v. Storer
Communication, Inc.230 As we saw above, the court there recognized that
The court further
all control “auctions must end sometime.”231
acknowledged that the distinction between lockups that draw in a bidder
225. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988) (citations
omitted).
226. See id. at 1286 (quoting Revlon to distinguish between lockups that “draw bidders
into a battle” and those that “end an active auction and foreclose further bidding”).
227. See id. (distinguishing “the potentially valid uses of a lockup from those that are
impermissible”).
228. See id. (“When one compares what KKR [the favored bidder] received for the
lockup, in contrast to its inconsiderable offer, the invalidity of the agreement becomes
patent.”).
229. Kenneth J. Nachbar, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.—The
Requirement of a Level Playing Field in Contested Mergers, and Its Effect on Lock-ups and
Other Bidding Deterrents, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 473, 488 (1987) (footnote omitted).
Accordingly, “classifying a lockup as a permissible type that promotes bidding, or a harmful
strain that discourages bidding, appears to be no more than conclusory judicial labels that are
affixed by hindsight after the lockup has been scrutinized by the courts.” Leo Herzel,
Misunderstanding Lockups, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 150, 177 (1986).
230. 849 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1988).
231. Id. at 576 (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964)).
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and those that end an auction is fatuous because all “lock-ups by definition
must discourage other bidders.”232 Accordingly, the question is not
whether a lockup ended the auction, but whether the target’s decision to
grant the lockup was a reasonable one.
Delaware courts likely would agree. After all, if the analysis in the
preceding part was correct in positing that motive is what matters, a board
that conducts a fair auction is a board whose motives will withstand
scrutiny.
3. No Liability for Mere Negligence
The emphasis on analyzing the target board’s motives in determining
whether their conduct satisfied Revlon is further exemplified by the
chancery court’s Lukens decision.233 Vice Chancellor Lamb emphasized
that Revlon, “like Unocal before it,” comes into play because “of ‘the
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interest,
rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders.’”234 Accordingly,
where “a complaint merely alleges that the directors were grossly negligent
in performing their duties in selling the corporation, without some factual
basis to suspect their motivations, any subsequent finding of liability will,
necessarily, depend on finding breaches of the duty of care,”235 which in
turn means that “judicial scrutiny will not often result in a greater likelihood
of liability than if the business judgment presumption applied from the
outset.”236 As a result, mere negligence in carrying out a sale of control
should not result in liability under Revlon.
4. Liability for Bad Faith?
While the precise geography of Revlon-land remains somewhat obscure,
the decisions in Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co.237 offered important
clarification by defining the relationship between Revlon and the emerging
case law on the obligation of directors to act in good faith.238 In turn, that
232. Id. (citing Nachbar, supra note 229, at 488).
233. In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720 (Del. Ch. 1999). We revisit Lukens
below in connection with the opinion’s treatment of when Revlon duties apply. See infra Part
IV.
234. Lukens, 757 A.2d at 731 (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279,
1286 (Del. 1989)).
235. Id. at 731–32.
236. Id. at 732 n.26.
237. C.A. No. 3176, 2008 WL 2923427 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2008), rev’d, 970 A.2d 235
(Del. 2009).
238. The developing good faith obligation grew out of the Delaware Supreme Court’s
1993 assertion that Delaware corporate law recognized a triad of fiduciary duties consisting
of care, loyalty, and good faith. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del.
1993). Oddly, however, it was not until 2006 that the court began clarifying the triad
formulation by defining good faith as encompassing
all actions required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders. A failure to act in good faith may be shown,
for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than
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guidance provided clarification of the extent to which an exculpatory
provision in the target corporation’s certificate of incorporation can insulate
the target’s directors from risk of monetary liability in Revlon cases.239
The board of directors of Lyondell Chemical Co. was approached in
April 2006 by Basell AF, which expressed an interest in acquiring
Lyondell.240 The board thought the offered price was inadequate and
expressed a lack of interest in selling.241 In May 2007, Access Industries,
Basell’s parent corporation, filed a Schedule 13D announcing that it had the
right to acquire an 8.3 percent stake in Lyondell.242 Lyondell’s board
recognized that the Schedule 13D put it into play, but decided to take a
wait-and-see approach to potential offers.243
On July 9, 2007, Access owner Leonard Blavatnik met with Lyondell
CEO Dan Smith to propose a $40 per share acquisition of Lyondell.244
After negotiations, Blavatnik raised his offer to $48 per share, conditioned
on a demand for a $400 million break-up fee and a merger agreement to be
signed not later than July 16.245 Negotiations and due diligence followed
for several days.246 On July 16, following a presentation by Lyondell’s
financial advisors, who stated that $48 was “an absolute home run” and that

that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary
acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating
conscious disregard for his duties.
In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (quoting the
chancery court decision below).
In Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), the court provided further clarification
by explaining “the obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary
duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty.” Id. at 370. Instead,
the obligation to act in good faith is now subsumed wholly within the duty of loyalty. See id.
(holding that “the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or
other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where the fiduciary
fails to act in good faith.”).
For criticism of the Delaware cases on this duty of good faith, see BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 1, at 160–63.
239. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (authorizing corporations to include a
provision in the certificate of incorporation that exculpates directors from monetary liability,
but forbidding such exculpation, inter alia, “for acts or omissions not in good faith”).
240. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176, 2008 WL 2923427, at *4 (Del. Ch.
July 29, 2008), rev’d, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
241. Id.
242. Id. at *4 n.17, *5.
243. Id. at *5.
244. Id. at *6.
245. Id. There was a certain amount of time pressure from Balavatnik’s perspective. At
the same time he was negotiating with Lyondell, he was also negotiating with an alternative
target (Huntsman). Blavatnik had a deadline of July 11 to raise his offer for Huntsman if he
wanted to go forward with that acquisition, so he asked Smith for Lyondell to provide a firm
indication of interest by the end of the day on the 11th. Lyondell’s board decided to provide
the requested indication. Blavatnik announced he would not be raising his offer for
Huntsman, and Huntsman terminated its negotiations with Blavatnik. See id. at 6–7
(describing the Huntsman bid).
246. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., 970 A.2d 235, 238 (Del. 2009).
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no other bidder was likely to pay more, Lyondell’s board approved the
deal.247
The chancery court conceded that Lyondell’s board “was active,
sophisticated and generally aware of the value of the Company and the
conditions of the markets in which the Company operated.”248 The board
long had been kept up to date on the company’s financial outlook and plans.
The board had been kept fully abreast of the negotiations with Access and
another potential bidder. The board had been briefed on Access’ proposal
by Lyondell’s financial advisor.
Despite all this, however, the chancery court found the board’s conduct
deficient in a number of respects. First, the “entire deal was negotiated,
considered, and agreed to in less than seven days.”249 This gave the court
“pause as to how hard the Board really thought about this transaction and
how carefully it sifted through the available market evidence.”250 The
court’s concern was consistent with an earlier Delaware Supreme Court
caution that “boards ‘that have failed to exercise due care are frequently
boards that have been rushed.’”251 Having said that, however, boards often
must act quickly. If courts insist that boards beat the bushes in search of the
proverbial two birds, they force boards to risk losing the equally proverbial
bird in the hand.
Second, the court criticized the board for failing to conduct a “formal
market check” by proactively seeking out competing bidders.252 The
chancery court’s concern in this regard, however, overlooked clear
Delaware Supreme Court teaching that no such formal test was mandatory
even in Revlon-land.253
Third, the court likewise criticized the board for not actively involving
itself in the negotiation and sale processes.254 Here again, however, the
chancery court overlooked clear Delaware Supreme Court teaching. Recall
that there is no single roadmap directors must follow through Revlonland.255
Despite the dubious nature of its expressed concerns, the chancery court
denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that there
was significant doubt that the board had satisfied its Revlon duties.256 Note
that the chancery court thus not only exposed the board to the possibility
247. Id. at 239.
248. Lyondell, 2008 WL 2923427, at *13.
249. Id. at *14.
250. Id.
251. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 922 (Del. 2000) (quoting Citron v. Fairchild
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 67 (Del. 1989)).
252. Lyondell, 2008 WL 2923427, at *14.
253. See generally Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).
254. Lyondell, 2008 WL 2923427, at *14.
255. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
256. Lyondell, 2008 WL 2923427, at *19 (“The record, as it presently stands, does not, as
a matter of undisputed material fact, demonstrate the Lyondell directors’ good faith
discharge of their Revlon duties—a known set of ‘duties’ requiring certain conduct or
impeccable knowledge of the market in the face of Basell’s offer to acquire the Company.”).
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that its decisions would be enjoined, the usual remedy in the Unocal/Revlon
context,257 but also the very serious risk of nonexculpable monetary
liability. In reversing, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that an
“extreme set of facts” is required to sustain a bad faith claim.258 Only
where the target’s board of directors “knowingly and completely failed to
undertake their responsibilities would they breach their duty of loyalty.”259
Put another way, liability would follow only where the “directors utterly
failed to attempt to obtain the best sale price.”260 Although motive did not
figure explicitly in that analysis, the Delaware Supreme Court’s Lyondell
decision in fact is fully consistent with the argument in the preceding part
that motive is what matters. After all, why would a board consciously
disregard known duties if not for some improper motive?
Importantly, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that the emergent
doctrine of good faith did not change the longstanding principle that there is
no single roadmap boards must follow in Revlon-land. The chancery court
had held that Revlon duties required that “directors must ‘engage actively in
the sale process,’ and they must confirm that they have obtained the best
available price either by conducting an auction, by conducting a market
check, or by demonstrating ‘an impeccable knowledge of the market.’”261
In reversing, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “bad faith will be found
if a ‘fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act,
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.’”262 Because there are
“no legally prescribed steps that directors must follow to satisfy their
Revlon duties,” however, “the directors’ failure to take any specific steps
during the sale process could not have demonstrated a conscious disregard
of their duties.”263
IV. CHANCERY REDRAWS THE BORDERS OF REVLON-LAND
Recall that post-QVC a transaction entered Revlon-land via three
checkpoints.264 Checkpoint 1 requires the target corporation to initiate “an
active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business
reorganization involving a clear breakup of the company,” with it being
unclear whether the reference to a “breakup” modifies both halves of this
checkpoint or only the latter.265 Checkpoint 2 requires that, “in response to
a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an
257. Cf. Paul Regan, Judicial Standards of Review of Corporate Fiduciary Action, 26
DEL. J. CORP. L. 995, 1021 (2001) (“Most applications of Unocal result in injunction
denied.”).
258. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 243.
259. Id. at 243–44.
260. Id. at 244.
261. See id. at 243 (summarizing the chancery court holding).
262. Id. (citing the chancery court opinion).
263. Id.
264. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
265. See Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289–90 (Del. 1994)
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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alternative transaction involving the break-up of the company.”266
Checkpoint 3 requires “a sale or change of control” of the target.267 In
recent years, however, a number of chancery court decisions have
disregarded this settled law and thus redrawn Revlon-land’s boundaries in
ways that are inconsistent both with the policy framework developed above
and Delaware Supreme Court precedents.
A. Hypotheticals
This section offers some simplified hypotheticals designed to illustrate
how Revlon ought to be applied in various settings, so as to set the stage for
analyzing the ways in which the chancery court has departed from both
precedent and sound policy in applying Revlon.
1. A Stock for Stock Merger of Equals
Acme and Ajax are both public corporations listed on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE). Acme offers to acquire Ajax in a merger of
equals in which Acme shareholders would receive Ajax stock for their
Acme shares. This is an easy case. Recall that in Time, Chancellor Allen
had said that Revlon was not triggered because there was no change of
control. This was so, he explained, because control of the combined entity
after the merger remained “in a large, fluid, changeable and changing
market.”268 The same is true here.269 Accordingly, because the merger
does not involve a sale or other change of control, the Acme “board’s
decision . . . is entitled to judicial deference pursuant to the procedural and
substantive operation of the business judgment rule.”270 In contrast, if the
acquiring firm has a controlling shareholder, the merger would result in the
requisite change of control and Revlon would trigger.271
2. A Triangular Merger
Start with the same facts as in the preceding hypothetical, but now
assume Acme proposes a triangular merger in which Ajax would be merged
into a wholly owned Acme subsidiary. Despite the change in form, the
substantive effect of this transaction is precisely the same. The combined
entity ends up being owned by dispersed shareholders “in a large, fluid,
changeable and changing market.” Only by elevating form over substance
could Revlon apply here.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
269. See Krim v. ProNet, Inc., 744 A.2d 523, 527 (Del. Ch. 1999) (noting that Revlon
“does not apply to stock-for-stock strategic mergers of publicly traded companies, a majority
of the stock of which is dispersed in the market.”).
270. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 928 (Del. 2003).
271. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47–48 (Del.
1994) (holding that Revlon was triggered because Viacom’s controlling shareholder Sumner
Redstone would control the combined entity following the transaction).

3322

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

3. An Asset Sale
This time, vary the hypothetical by assuming that Acme proposes to
acquire substantially all of Ajax’s assets in exchange for Acme stock, after
which Ajax will liquidate itself and, after paying off all creditors, distribute
the remaining Acme shares to its shareholders as a liquidating final
dividend. Although the form of this transaction obviously involves a sale of
Ajax’s assets and the disappearance of Ajax, the substance of the
transaction is the same as in our first two hypotheticals. Acme ends up
owning Ajax, but control of the post-transaction entity ends up being owned
by dispersed shareholders in the requisite “large, fluid, changeable and
changing market.”
4. Transactions in Which Part or All of the Consideration Consists of Cash
In this hypothetical, change the facts by changing the form of
consideration. Version A entails a merger between Acme and Ajax in
which Ajax shareholders get cash for their stock. Version B entails a
triangular merger between Ajax and a wholly owned Acme subsidiary in
which the Ajax shareholders get cash. Version C is a tender offer for any
and all Ajax shares for cash to be followed by a freeze-out merger in which
any remaining Ajax shareholders will be squeezed out in return for cash.
Checkpoint 1 is not triggered on the bare facts of any of these versions of
the hypothetical. Ajax did not initiate an active bidding process seeking to
sell itself. Likewise, none of the transactions will result in a business
reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company.
Checkpoint 2 is not triggered, inter alia, because none of Ajax’s actions
were responsive to an unwanted offer.
As for Checkpoint 3, the key issue is whether a cash sale constitutes “a
sale or change of control.” A going private transaction in which the target
is acquired for cash by a private equity firm obviously would enter Revlonland via this third portal,272 but what if the acquirer is publicly held and has
no controlling shareholder? To answer that question, one must know
whether control modifies both “sale” and “change” or only modifies
“change.” If the former, cash sales do not trigger Revlon duties if the
acquirer is publicly held.

272. Indeed, such a transaction was the one at issue in Revlon itself. See Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (discussing the Forstmann
Little leveraged buyout firm’s attempt to acquire Revlon).
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B. Chancery Precedents on Cash Sales
A number of chancery court decisions have found Revlon duties to be
triggered by transactions in which all or part of the acquisition
consideration consisted of cash.273
1. Lukens Inc.
In 1998, Lukens, Inc. and Bethlehem Steel Corp. agreed to a merger in
which the latter would exchange a combination of its stock and cash valued
at $30 per share for each share of Lukens common stock. The merger
agreement provided that each Lukens shareholder would have the right to
elect how much cash to receive, “subject to a maximum total cash payout
equal to 62% of the total consideration.”274 If all Lukens shareholders
opted for cash, the split thus would be 62–38 cash and stock.
In dictum,275 Vice Chancellor Lamb observed:
[A]lthough there is no case directly on point, I cannot understand how the
Director Defendants were not obliged, in the circumstances, to seek out
the best price reasonably available. The defendants argue that because
over 30% of the merger consideration was shares of Bethlehem common
stock, a widely held company without any controlling shareholder, Revlon
and QVC do not apply. I disagree. Whether 62% or 100% of the
consideration was to be in cash, the directors were obliged to take
reasonable steps to ensure that the shareholders received the best price

273. Not all chancery court decisions have fallen into this error, however. For example,
in In re Synthes, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 50 A.3d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2012), Chancellor
Strine observed:
[P]laintiffs are also wrong on the merits of their argument that Revlon applies.
Their sole basis for claiming that Revlon applies is that the Synthes stockholders
are receiving mixed consideration of 65% J&J stock and 35% cash for their
Synthes stock, and that this blended consideration represents the last chance they
have to get a premium for their Synthes shares. But under binding authority of our
Supreme Court as set forth in QVC and its progeny, Revlon duties only apply when
a corporation undertakes a transaction that results in the sale or change of
control. . . . [T]he mixed consideration Merger does not qualify as a change of
control under our Supreme Court’s precedent. A change of control “does not
occur for purposes of Revlon where control of the corporation remains, postmerger, in a large, fluid market.” Here, the Merger consideration consists of a mix
of 65% stock and 35% cash, with the stock portion being stock in a company
whose shares are held in large, fluid market.
Id. at 1047 (footnotes omitted). Chancellor Strine’s holding is fully consistent with the
understanding of Revlon and its progeny advanced herein. Curiously, however, Chancellor
Strine fails to discuss any of the contrary chancery court precedents critiqued in the
following sections.
274. In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 725 (Del. Ch. 1999).
275. The discussion of whether Revlon duties had triggered was mere dicta, because Vice
Chancellor Lamb had concluded that, even “assuming that Revlon is implicated, the
Complaint must still be dismissed.” Id. at 732 n.25. This was so because plaintiff’s claims
sounded solely under the duty of care and therefore were not cognizable in light of the target
corporation’s exculpatory charter provision under section 102(b)(7). See id. at 732–34
(discussing the effect of Lukens’s exculpatory charter provision).
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available because, in any event, for a substantial majority of the thencurrent shareholders, “there is no long run.”276

Vice Chancellor Lamb cited no authority directly supporting his
understanding of the change of control test. The phrase, “there is no long
run,” was quoted from an unpublished opinion by Chancellor Allen, in
which the latter had indeed stated:
In the setting of a sale of a company for cash, the board’s duty to
shareholders is inconsistent with acts not designed to maximize present
share value, acts which in other circumstances might be accounted for or
justified by reference to the long run interest of shareholders. In such a
setting, for the present shareholders, there is no long run.277

Even so, however, Allen’s TW Services opinion provides little support for
Lamb’s dicta. First, Allen’s comment itself is also dictum. The issue in TW
Services was whether the target’s board of directors had properly decided to
turn down a proposed merger. Whether Revlon ever applied to such a
decision was, Allen explained, an issue that did not then “need . . . [to] be
decided.”278
Second, Allen’s comment clearly is directed to sales of control in which
100 percent of the consideration takes the form of cash. This is shown, for
example, by his description of the relevant transaction as one in which “all
of the current shareholders will be removed from the field.”279 If even a
small fraction of the consideration is in acquiring company stock or debt,
however, not all of the current target shareholders will be removed from the
field. Some will remain as shareholders or creditors of the post-transaction
combined entity (assuming that entity to be the field to which Allen
referred).
Third, the would-be acquirer in TW Services was a subsidiary of a limited
partnership controlled by Coniston Partners, a private equity fund, through
various affiliates.280 As such, although Allen did not highlight the issue in
the relevant passage, this was not a case in which control of the posttransaction combined entity was “in a large, fluid, changeable and changing
market.” To the contrary, if the transaction succeeded, the target would be
taken private by Coniston and its affiliates who would thereafter
exclusively control it. In contrast, if the acquirer had been publicly held
and lacked a controlling shareholder, the pre-transaction TW Services
shareholders could use the cash they received in the acquisition to buy stock
in the post-transaction combined entity. Any removal from the field they
might experience as a result of the transaction thus would be transitory. Put
another way, for them there is at least the potential for a long run.

276. Id. at 732 n.25.
277. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Civ. A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL
20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (footnotes omitted).
278. Id. at *8.
279. Id. at *7.
280. See id. at *2 (describing the ownership structure of the proposed acquisition vehicle).
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Taken together, these considerations show that TW Services at most
stands for the proposition that a 100 percent cash sale of control triggers
Revlon. More likely, moreover, the case probably stands for the even more
limited proposition that a 100 percent cash sale in the context of a going
private transaction triggers Revlon. In addition, as already noted, the
passage on which Vice Chancellor Lamb relied was obvious dictum.
Finally, although Delaware gives precedential value to unpublished
opinions,281 surely that factor should be taken into account in assessing how
much weight to give such opinions.
The only other authority cited by Vice Chancellor Lamb in the relevant
passage of Lukens was the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in In re
Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation.282 Because Santa Fe
contradicts all of the relevant chancery court decisions to be discussed in
this section, analysis of the conflict between it and Lukens is deferred until
the other cases have been discussed.283 Suffice it for now to say that Vice
Chancellor Lamb ducked Santa Fe by dismissing it out of hand.284
2. NYMEX
The Lukens dicta seemingly went unnoticed for almost a decade, when it
resurfaced in another chancery court decision.285 In 2007, the board of
directors of NYMEX Holdings, Inc., set up a special committee to consider
possible sales or acquisitions.286 Shortly thereafter, NYMEX Chairman of
the Board Richard Schaeffer met with then–NYSE CEO John Thain.287 In
their discussions, the latter “spoke of purchasing NYMEX for $142 per
share,” but the NYSE ultimately failed to make a formal acquisition
proposal.288
Even before the abortive negotiations with the NYSE, Schaeffer and
NYMEX CEO James Newsome had begun negotiations with
representatives of CME Group, Inc., which eventually resulted in CME
making an offer to acquire NYMEX. CME offered a mix of cash and CME
stock in exchange for the NYMEX stockholders’ shares, which represented
a mix of “56% CME stock and 44% cash.”289
In NYMEX, Vice Chancellor Noble raised, but ultimately did not resolve,
the question of whether Revlon applied on those facts.290 As with Lukens,
281. See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 14(b)(vi)B(2) (2013).
282. 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
283. See infra Part IV.C.
284. See infra text accompanying note 333 (discussing Lukens’s analysis of Santa Fe).
285. A Westlaw search in the DE-CS database using the search term “Lukens /s Revlon”
found no Delaware cases discussing the relevant dicta prior to the NYMEX decision.
286. In re NYMEX S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 3621-VCN, 3835-VCN, 2009 WL
3206051 at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2009). At that time, NYMEX “was the largest commodity
futures exchange in the world.” Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at *5–6.
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the target corporation’s certificate of incorporation included a section
102(b)(7) exculpatory provision, which required dismissal of the complaint
because the plaintiffs had failed adequately to plead a breach of the duty of
loyalty or lack of good faith. Accordingly, as with Lukens, NYMEX’s
precedential value is reduced because we again are dealing with dicta.291
In that dicta, Vice Chancellor Noble opined:
Revlon scrutiny applies only to transactions “‘in which a fundamental
change of corporate control occurs or is contemplated.’” [Paramount
Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46 (Del. 1994)
(quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286
(Del.1989)).] They dispute what constitutes a fundamental change of
control sufficient to trigger Revlon scrutiny. A fundamental change of
control does not occur for purposes of Revlon where control of the
corporation remains, post-merger, in a large, fluid market. [See id. at 47.]
Thus, for example, in a transaction where cash is the exclusive
consideration paid to the acquired corporation’s shareholders, a
fundamental change of corporate control occurs—thereby triggering
Revlon—because control of the corporation does not continue in a large,
fluid market. In transactions, such as the present one, that involve merger
consideration that is a mix of cash and stock—the stock portion being
stock of an acquirer whose shares are held in a large, fluid market—“[t]he
[Delaware] Supreme Court has not set out a black line rule explaining
what percentage of the consideration can be cash without triggering
Revlon.” [In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 732 n.25 (Del.
Ch. 1999).]292

The block quotation includes the footnotes from the opinion to draw the
reader’s attention to how carefully Vice Chancellor Noble included
citations of support for three of the four sentences in the passage. Crucially,
however, he omitted a citation of support for the critical proposition that “a
fundamental change of corporate control occurs” “in a transaction where
cash is the exclusive consideration.” If this passage constituted a holding
rather than dicta, that statement would be the holding. Of the four
sentences in the passage, accordingly, it is this passage that most demands
validation by precedent. In light of the thorough job the Vice Chancellor
did in providing support for his other assertions, this glaring omission is
quite telling.
The final sentence of the passage, with its quotation from Lukens, does
not provide the missing support. Even setting aside the argument above
that Lukens should be given little precedential weight,293 the Lukens
quotation does not tell the whole story. True, the Delaware Supreme Court
had not set out a bright-line rule defining what percentage of cash triggered
291. Cf. ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, Civ. A. 14514, 1999 WL 160131, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 2, 1999) (declining to find that “obiter dictum” held “any precedential value for my
decision here”).
292. NYMEX, 2009 WL 3206051, at *5 (footnotes included in brackets).
293. See supra text accompanying note 291 (noting that the relevant passage from Lukens
was mere dicta).
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Revlon. It was (and remains) equally true, however, that the Delaware
Supreme Court has never held that the form and allocation of the
consideration is even relevant to the question of whether Revlon has been
triggered. To the contrary, as discussed below, the better reading of the
relevant Delaware Supreme Court precedents is that the form of the
consideration is wholly irrelevant to that question.294
Finally, notice that the passage also errs in asserting that “in a transaction
where cash is the exclusive consideration paid to the acquired corporation’s
shareholders . . . control of the corporation does not continue in a large,
fluid market.”295 Obviously, this is a reference to Chancellor Allen’s
holding in Time that the Time-Warner merger agreement would not result in
a transfer of control because control remained “in a large, fluid, changeable
and changing market.”296 In Time, Chancellor Allen obviously was
referring to control not of the target corporation but to control of the posttransaction combined entity. A fluid market controlled the target and there
was no change of control because control of the combined entity would
remain in such a market after the transaction was completed. In an all-cash
deal—let alone a partial-cash deal like the one at issue in NYMEX—so long
as the acquirer is publicly held, control of the combined post-transaction
entity will rest in the hands of “a large, fluid, changeable and changing
market.” Accordingly, it is not the form of the consideration that matters
under Time, but whether the acquirer has a controlling shareholder.
3. Smurfit-Stone Container Corp.
Although both Lukens and NYMEX had limited precedential value on this
point because the relevant passages were mere dicta, in Smurfit-Stone
Container Corp. Shareholder Litigation,297 Vice Chancellor Parsons relied
principally on those cases to hold—for the first time—that all- or partialcash transactions trigger Revlon.298 The case involved a triangular merger
in which publicly held target Smurfit was to merge into a wholly owned
subsidiary of publicly held acquirer Rock-Tenn Co. In the merger, the
shareholders of Smurfit got $35 per share, with 50 percent of the
consideration paid in cash and 50 percent paid in Rock-Tenn stock.
Accordingly, as the Vice Chancellor observed that, “this case provides
cause . . . to address a question that has not yet been squarely addressed in
Delaware law; namely, whether and in what circumstances Revlon applies
when merger consideration is split roughly evenly between cash and
stock.”299

294. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the relevant precedents).
295. NYMEX, 2009 WL 3206051, at *5.
296. See supra text accompanying note 170 (quoting the relevant passage from the Time
opinion).
297. 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. 2011).
298. See id. at *12–14 (discussing when Revlon applies).
299. Id. at *1.
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There was no dispute that Checkpoints 1 and 2 were not implicated on
these facts. There was no claim that the target’s board had initiated an
active bidding process to sell itself or had sought to effect a reorganization
involving a breakup of Smurfit.300 There was no claim that the board had
abandoned its long-term strategy in response to a bidder’s offer or sought
an alternative transaction involving a breakup of the target.301
As such, only Checkpoint 3’s reference to “a sale or change of control”
was at issue.302 Vice Chancellor Parsons began his analysis by observing
that one entered Revlon-land via this checkpoint in all-cash transactions.303
As support for that proposition, he cited Lukens, Topps, and TW Services.
As we have seen, however, the latter is a very weak reed on which to rest
that claim. As for Topps,304 then–Vice Chancellor Strine opined therein
that “[w]hen directors propose to sell a company for cash or engage in a
change of control transaction, they must take reasonable measures to ensure
that the stockholders receive the highest value reasonably attainable.”305
Crucially, however, Topps involved a going private transaction in which the
target would be acquired by “a private equity firm . . . , The Tornante
Company, LLC, in an alliance with another private equity group, Madison
Dearborn Capital Partners, LLC.”306 Accordingly, like TW Services, Topps
does not stand for the proposition that a cash transaction by a publicly held
acquirer triggers Revlon. Finally, of course, Lukens was mere dicta on this
point.307
Unlike Lukens and NYMEX, both of which had failed to engage the key
passage from Chancellor Allen’s Time opinion, in Smurfit Vice Chancellor
Parsons expressly held that Revlon applied even though “control of RockTenn after closing will remain in a large, fluid, changing, and changeable
market” and the “Smurfit-Stone stockholders will retain the right to obtain a
control premium in the future.”308 Although he acknowledged that the
defendants’ argument to the contrary was “cogent,”309 he dismissed it by
observing that “[e]ven if Rock-Tenn has no controlling stockholder and
Smurfit-Stone’s stockholders will not be relegated to a minority status in
300. See id. at *12 (“Plaintiffs do not allege that the Board initiated an active bidding
process to sell itself or effected a reorganization involving the break-up of Smurfit-Stone.”).
301. See id. (noting that plaintiffs had not claimed “that the Board abandoned its longterm strategy in response to a bidder’s offer and sought an alternative transaction involving
the break-up of the Company”).
302. See id. (explaining that plaintiffs alleged that “Revlon should apply to this case
because the Merger Consideration was comprised of 50% cash and 50% stock at the time the
parties entered into the Agreement, which qualifies the Proposed Transaction as a ‘change of
control’ transaction”).
303. See id. at *13 (“Revlon will govern a board’s decision to sell a corporation where
stockholders will receive cash for their shares.”).
304. In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007).
305. Id. at 64.
306. Id. at 65.
307. See supra note 275 and accompanying text (explaining why the relevant statement in
Lukens was dicta rather than a holding).
308. Smurfit, 2011 WL 2028076, at *15.
309. Id.
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the postmerger entity, half of their investment will be liquidated.”310
Accordingly, the Vice Chancellor asserted that “the fact that control of
Rock-Tenn after consummation will remain in a large pool of unaffiliated
stockholders, while important, neither addresses nor affords protection to
the portion of the stockholders’ investment that will be converted to cash
and thereby be deprived of its long-run potential.”311
But that concern is misplaced. First, the locus of control of the posttransaction combined entity is not merely important, but rather is
dispositive. In Time, Chancellor Allen did not treat the locus as a factor to
be considered. Instead, he dismissed the Revlon claim solely because
control of the combined entity remained “in a large, fluid, changeable and
changing market.”312 Second, as we have now seen repeatedly, the
argument about whether target shareholders get to participate in the longrun potential of the combined entity is not a relevant—let alone
dispositive—consideration.313
In sum, by embracing Vice Chancellor Lamb’s reasoning, Vice
Chancellor Parsons embraced error. The precedents on which he relied
provide weak reeds on which to rest such an important holding. The policy
arguments on which he relied likewise are unavailing. The borders of
Revlon-land thus have suffered a significant distortion.
4. Steinhardt
Also in 2011, Vice Chancellor Laster issued a bench ruling possibly
portending an even greater erosion of the borders of Revlon-land.314 In
Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson,315 Occam Networks proposed to acquire
Calix in a merger in which the latter’s shareholders would receive a
package of 50 percent cash and 50 percent stock valued at $7.75 per
share.316 If the transaction went through, the former target shareholders
would own between 15 percent and 19 percent of the post-transaction
combined entity’s voting stock.317
Vice Chancellor Laster held that the transaction should be reviewed
using an “enhanced scrutiny” standard, which in context appears to be a

310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, and 10935, 1989 WL
79880, at *739 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff’d on other grounds, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
313. See supra notes 294–96 and accompanying text (explaining why the form of
consideration is not relevant).
314. I am indebted to Steven M. Haas, Esq., of Hunton & Williams for calling this case to
my attention and providing a very helpful research memorandum about the case. See
Memorandum from Steven M. Haas, Delaware Court Questions Application of Business
Judgment Rule to Stock-for-Stock Mergers (February 8, 2011) (on file with the author).
315. Transcript of Ruling of the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction,
Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson, No. 5878-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2011) [hereinafter
Transcript of Ruling], available at http://www.alston.com/files/docs/Occam_Ruling.pdf.
316. Haas, supra note 314.
317. Id.
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reference to the QVC formulation of the unified standard of review
applicable to both Unocal and Revlon cases.318 If the Vice Chancellor had
hung his holding on Lukens, the case could be dismissed as simply moving
the trigger at which Revlon comes into play from 60 percent cash down to
50 percent cash.319 In fact, however, Vice Chancellor Laster focused on the
fact that after the merger the former target shareholders would own only
approximately 15 percent of the stock of the combined entity. As a result,
he worried, this was the last opportunity the target directors and managers
would have to maximize the target shareholders’ share of a control
premium.320 If the combined entity someday were to be sold, Laster
opined, the Occam Network shareholders would “only get 15 percent” of
any control premium paid in that later transaction.321
As discussed below, Vice Chancellor Laster’s analysis is problematic in
the first instance because the controlling Delaware Supreme Court
precedents do not premise Revlon’s applicability on the ability of target
shareholders to participate in future takeover premia.322 Second, the Vice
Chancellor’s analysis overlooks many key facts. If Calix were to be
acquired in the future, any former target shareholders would now get the
benefit of Calix’s directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties. By the time
Calix was acquired in the future, moreover, many of the former target
shareholders presumably long since would have sold their Calix shares. If
those shareholders are unlikely to be around when future takeover premia
are divided, why should the prospect of such premia determine the fiduciary
duties of the target’s board and management?
Third, why rest the analysis on the possibility that the acquirer might be
acquired in the future? Many companies are never subjected to a takeover
offer, let alone actually acquired. In addition, assuming the companies least
likely to be acquired in the future are those with a controlling shareholder,
Vice Chancellor Laster’s analysis would imply that there is no reason to
apply Revlon. Yet, of course, that is precisely the context in which Revlon
most clearly applies.323
Finally, and most disturbingly, because Vice Chancellor Laster’s analysis
does not depend on the percentage of the consideration paid in cash, that
analysis would apply equally well to a stock-for-stock merger. Yet, both
Chancellor Allen and the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinions in Time

318. Transcript of Ruling, supra note 315, at 7.
319. Haas, supra note 314.
320. Transcript of Ruling, supra note 315, at 4–6 (“This is a situation where the target
stockholders are in the end stage in terms of their interest in Occam. This is the only chance
they have to have their fiduciaries bargain for a premium for their shares as the holders of
equity interests in that entity.”).
321. Id.
322. See infra notes 344–46 and accompanying text (discussing QVC’s discussion of the
relevance of control premia).
323. See supra text accompanying note 271 (explaining that Revlon is triggered when the
acquiring firm has a controlling shareholder).
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made clear that Revlon does not apply to such mergers.324 This doctrinal
conflict suggests that Vice Chancellor Laster’s approach should be rejected.
C. Lukens and Its Progeny Are Inconsistent with Controlling Delaware
Supreme Court Precedents
The most directly relevant Delaware Supreme Court precedent is In re
Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation.325 Santa Fe and Burlington
were both publicly held Delaware corporations.326 After negotiations, they
agreed to a complicated deal in which the two companies would make a
joint tender offer for up to 33 percent of Santa Fe’s shares at $20 per share
in cash.327 If successful, the offer would give Burlington 16 percent of
Santa Fe’s remaining outstanding shares.328 If the offer succeeded, a
freeze-out merger in which remaining Santa Fe shareholders would get
Burlington shares in exchange for their Santa Fe stock would follow it.329
All the while, Santa Fe’s board of directors was fending off an unsolicited
takeover bid by Union Pacific.330
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the
deal triggered Revlon duties for Santa Fe’s directors on grounds that the
plaintiffs “failed to allege that control of Burlington and Santa Fe after the
merger would not remain ‘in a large, fluid, changeable and changing
market.’”331 The clear implication is that the form of consideration was not
the relevant issue. Instead, the issue was whether the Burlington
shareholders would remain dispersed “in a large, fluid, changeable and
changing market.”
Yet, in NYMEX, the chancery court characterized Santa Fe as simply
setting a floor—33 percent cash—below which one did not enter Revlonland.332 As for higher ratios, the chancery court relied on Lukens for the
proposition that the Delaware “Supreme Court has not set out a black line
rule explaining what percentage of the consideration can be cash without
triggering Revlon.”333
324. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing rules governing stock-for-stock mergers).
325. 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
326. Id. at 63.
327. See id. at 63–64 (describing the negotiations and deal terms).
328. Id. at 64.
329. Id.
330. See id. at 63–64 (describing the Union Pacific offer).
331. Id. at 71.
332. In re NYMEX S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 3621-VCN, 3835-VCN, 2009 WL
3206051, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2009).
333. Id. In sharp contrast, Chancellor Strine recently observed:
Here, the Merger consideration consists of a mix of 65% stock and 35% cash, with
the stock portion being stock in a company whose shares are held in large, fluid
market. In the case of In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation, the
Supreme Court held that a merger transaction involving nearly equivalent
consideration of 33% cash and 67% stock did not trigger Revlon review when
there was no basis to infer that the stock portion of that consideration was stock in
a controlled company. That decision is binding precedent.
In re Synthes, Inc. S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1048 (Del. Ch. 2012) (footnote omitted).
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This characterization of Santa Fe is hard to square with the Delaware
Supreme Court’s analysis in the case, which makes no reference to floors or
ceilings, but rather to the postdeal “stock ownership structure of
Burlington.”334 It is even more difficult to square with the three
checkpoints established by Arnold v. Society for Saving Bancorp, Inc.335
The Smurfit court finessed Arnold in the first instance by selective
quotation of the key passage setting out the three checkpoints. The Smurfit
court quoted it as follows:
The Delaware Supreme Court has determined that a board might find
itself faced with such a duty in at least three scenarios: “(1) when a
corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to
effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the
company[ ]; (2) where, in response to a bidder’s offer, a target abandons
its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the
break-up of the company; or (3) when approval of a transaction results in
a sale or change of control[.]”336

The observant reader will note that the chancery court thereby omitted the
critical qualifier Arnold adds to Checkpoint 3. To emphasize the point, let
us quote the pertinent part of Arnold again in full: “(3) when approval of a
transaction results in a sale or change of control. In the latter situation,
there is no sale or change in control when [c]ontrol of both [companies]
remain[s] in a large, fluid, changeable and changing market.”337
Arnold’s clear implication is that an acquisition by a publicly held
corporation with no controlling shareholder that results in the combined
corporate entity being owned by dispersed shareholders in the proverbial
“large, fluid, changeable and changing market” does not trigger Revlon
whether the deal is structured as all stock, all cash, or somewhere in the
middle. The form of consideration is simply irrelevant.
The Delaware Supreme Court’s more recent opinion in Lyondell
confirms this reading of both Santa Fe and Arnold. In addition to the
substantive errors made by the chancery court in Lyondell,338 the chancery
court also took too expansive an approach to when Revlon duties are
triggered by holding that the target board enters Revlon-land when it
“undertakes a sale of the company for cash.”339
Checkpoint 1 was inapplicable on Lyondell’s facts, because the target
board had not initiated “an active bidding process,” let alone one that would
involve a breakup of the company. Checkpoint 2 was inapplicable because
334. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del 1995).
335. 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
336. Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 2028076, at *12 (Del. Ch.
May 24, 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1290).
337. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1290 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
338. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the chancery court’s errors in defining Revlon
duties).
339. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176-VCN, 2008 WL 2923427, at *12 (Del.
Ch. July 29, 2008), rev’d, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
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the transaction did not involve a hostile offer or an abandonment of the
target’s long-term strategy or a breakup of the company.
Checkpoint 3, however, was triggered once the target board decided to
sell the company to Access because Access was a privately held
corporation. The transaction therefore would have involved a change of
control from disperse public shareholders in “a large, fluid, changeable and
changing market” to a single controlling shareholder. Although the
Delaware Supreme Court did not quote that now proverbial standard, it did
hold that one does not enter Revlon-land simply because a prospective
target company is “in play.”340 Instead, one does so “only when a company
embarks on a transaction—on its own initiative or in response to an
unsolicited offer—that will result in a change of control.”341
Fairly read, this confirms that in the phrase “sale or change of control,”
as used in Checkpoint 3, control must be understood to modify both the
words “sale” and “change.” Accordingly, Lyondell confirms that the
interpretation of Arnold and Santa Fe set out above is the correct one rather
than that offered by the chancery court.
D. Lukens and Its Progeny Are Inconsistent with the Policies
Underlying Revlon
The logic of the chancery court decisions rests on the policy that target
shareholders who get cash have no opportunity to participate in the
potential postacquisition gains that may accrue to shareholders of the
combined company:
Defendants emphasize that no Smurfit-Stone stockholder involuntarily
or voluntarily can be cashed out completely and, after consummation of
the Proposed Transaction, the stockholders will own slightly less than half
of Rock-Tenn. . . . Defendants lose sight of the fact that while no
Smurfit-Stone stockholder will be cashed out 100%, 100% of its
stockholders who elect to participate in the merger will see approximately
50% of their Smurfit-Stone investment cashed out. As such, like Vice
Chancellor Lamb’s concern that potentially there was no “tomorrow” for
a substantial majority of Lukens stockholders, the concern here is that
there is no “tomorrow” for approximately 50% of each stockholder’s
investment in Smurfit-Stone. That each stockholder may retain a portion
of her investment after the merger is insufficient to distinguish the
reasoning of Lukens, which concerns the need for the Court to scrutinize
under Revlon a transaction that constitutes an end-game for all or a
substantial part of a stockholder’s investment in a Delaware
corporation.342

340. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 242.
341. Id.
342. Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 2028076, at *14 (Del. Ch.
May 24, 2011).
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As we have seen, however, this concern makes no sense.343 As long as the
acquirer is publicly held, shareholders who get cash could simply turn
around and buy stock in the postacquisition company. They would then
participate in any post-transaction gains, including any future takeover
premium. Only if there has been a change of control is that option
foreclosed.
In any event, as the discussion in Part II.C makes clear, the relevant
policy concern is not whether there is a future. To be sure, QVC spoke of
“an asset belonging to public shareholders” (i.e., “a control premium”).344
As we saw above, although he did not cite QVC, Vice Chancellor Laster
implicated this concern by holding that Revlon was triggered because the
transaction at issue was the “only chance [the target shareholders would]
have to have their fiduciaries bargain for a premium for their shares.”345
If QVC is properly understood, however, the Delaware Supreme Court
was not showing concern for whether there will be a tomorrow for the
shareholders. Instead, as discussed above, the court was concerned in QVC
with the division of gains between target and acquirer shareholders because
the post-transaction company would have a dominating controlling
shareholder.346
As the analysis of QVC in Part II.C.2 explained, the relevant concern thus
is the potential that conflicted interests will affect the target’s board of
directors’ decisions.347 Indeed, as we have seen, even Vice Chancellor
Lamb’s opinion in Lukens recognized that the motivating concern
underlying Revlon is “the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interest, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders.”348 Curiously, however, Vice Chancellor Lamb brought that
policy concern into play only with respect to whether the directors had
satisfied their Revlon duties, while ignoring it when deciding whether those
duties have triggered. But nothing in Revlon or QVC suggests that that
policy is limited to the former issue rather than both inquiries.
Because the conflict of interest policy concern is the underlying driver of
both aspects of Revlon, the chancery court in Lukens and its progeny should
343. See supra text accompanying notes 279–80 (discussing Lukens last period
argument).
344. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (quoting QVC).
345. See supra note 320 and accompanying text (quoting Transcript of Ruling, supra note
315). In In re Synthes, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 50 A.3d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2012), the
plaintiffs argued that Revlon was triggered by a deal “represent[ing] the last chance they
have to get a premium for their [target company] shares.” Id. at 1047. Chancellor Strine
rejected that argument, holding that the plaintiffs were “wrong on the merits.” Id. At least
implicitly, Chancellor Strine thus rejected the focus in Steinhardt on the final period aspect
of the transactions at bar.
346. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text (discussing the proper interpretation
of QVC).
347. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text (discussing the conflicts of interest
on the part of target managers and directors when the postmerger entity has a controlling
shareholder).
348. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (quoting Lukens).
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have considered whether the all- or partial-cash transactions necessarily
implicate conflicts of interest akin to those at issue in Revlon and QVC. If
the various Vice Chancellors had done so, they would have recognized that,
so long as acquisitions of publicly held corporations are conducted by other
publicly held corporations, diversified shareholders will be indifferent as to
the allocations of gains between the parties.349 In turn, those shareholders
also will be indifferent as to the form of consideration.
In contrast, if the transaction results in a privately held entity, a
diversified shareholder cannot be on both sides of the transaction. If the
post-transaction entity remains publicly held, but will be dominated by a
controlling shareholder, there is a substantial risk that the control
shareholder will be able to extract non–pro rata benefits in the future and
get a sweetheart deal from target directors in the initial acquisition. In
either situation, the division of gains matters a lot. As such, investors
would prefer to see gains in such transactions allocated to the target.350 It is
in these situations that Revlon should come into play.
E. Should Revlon Be Extended to All Corporate Acquisitions?
A proponent of Lukens and its progeny might respond to the arguments
made above by arguing that Delaware law is not static, which is certainly
true.351 “It must grow and develop in response to, indeed in anticipation of,
evolving concepts and needs,” to quote Unocal itself.352 Perhaps the
chancery court is groping toward a new understanding of Revlon, which
would necessitate a broader application to a wider array of transactions.353
In particular, the emphasis on allocation of the control premia in Vice
Chancellor Laster’s bench ruling in Steinhardt suggests a concern that
target managers may have sold too cheaply. Put another way, “Vice
Chancellor Laster was concerned that the target stockholders’ interest in the
349. See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text (discussing investor preferences
with respect to the allocation of gains when the postmerger entity does not have a controlling
shareholder).
350. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text (discussing investor preferences
with respect to the allocation of gains when the postmerger entity has a controlling
shareholder).
351. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985) (noting
that Delaware “corporate law is not static”).
352. Id.
353. Of course, even if the chancery court is correct in this regard, the evolution properly
should take place only once the Delaware Supreme Court has given its imprimatur to Lukens
and its progeny. In In re Synthes, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 50 A.3d 1022 (Del. Ch.
2012), the plaintiffs argued that Revlon was triggered by a deal in which they would receive
“mixed consideration of 65% J&J stock and 35% cash for their Synthes stock,” because “this
blended consideration represents the last chance they have to get a premium for their Synthes
shares.” Id. at 1047. Chancellor Strine squarely rejected this argument, holding that the
plaintiffs were “wrong on the merits.” Id. The Chancellor based that holding on the “binding
authority of our Supreme Court as set forth in QVC and its progeny,” pursuant to which
“Revlon duties only apply when a corporation undertakes a transaction that results in the sale
or change of control.” Id. As suggested by his use of the word “binding,” trial courts are
supposed to follow higher court precedents even when they disagree with them.

3336

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

target’s assets could be diluted and value improperly transferred to the
buyer’s stockholders if the target board failed to secure an adequate price in
the merger.”354 By invoking Revlon and its associated reasonableness
standard, the Vice Chancellor gave himself far greater latitude to evaluate
the merits of the sale than would be allowed under the business judgment
rule.
If this is the direction in which the chancery court is seeking to evolve
Revlon, however, there are a number of reasons to abort that effort. First,
although Steinhardt could be understood as a logical extension of the
repeated concerns expressed in Lukens and its progeny with final period
transactions, the concern manifests itself in the former via a much different
legal rule. Instead of focusing on what percentage of the consideration
takes the form of cash, Vice Chancellor Laster focused on what percentage
of the combined entity will be held by former target shareholders.355 This
doctrinal shift is essential to effectuating the new policy goal because the
percentage of the consideration taking the form of cash is wholly irrelevant
to determining whether the target board obtained an adequate price (or, for
that matter, whether the target board had a conflict of interest). Indeed, if
nothing else, Vice Chancellor Laster’s holding in Steinhardt at least
exposed, albeit sub silentio, the inherent flaw in the reasoning of Lukens
and its progeny. Simply put, the percentage of the consideration paid in
cash advances no cognizable policy concern.
Second, if the new standard is to be that Revlon is triggered when the
target shareholders will end up with a small percentage of the stock of the
post-transaction combined entity, that standard is both unworkable and
illogical. Any point at which one draws the line will necessarily be
arbitrary. Whether the target shareholders end up with 1 percent or 99
percent of the stock of the post-transaction corporation, there will still be a
risk that the target board may have failed to obtain an adequate price.
These observations demonstrate that neither the form of the consideration
nor the percentage of the combined entity ultimately owned by former
target shareholders adequately responds to Vice Chancellor Laster’s
concern. Indeed, no trigger could satisfactorily address that concern,
because it is inevitably present in all corporate acquisitions. As noted
above, sometimes side payments from the favored bidder may induce the
target board to accept a lower price than the maximum attainable.356 Other
times, however, the target board may simply have made mistakes.
Addressing the Vice Chancellor’s concern thus requires extending the QVC
reasonableness standard to all corporate acquisitions, so that the court can
determine whether the target board got an adequate price and, if not, why
not.

354. Haas, supra note 314.
355. See supra notes 319–20 and accompanying text (discussing the Steinhardt holding).
356. See supra notes 73–74 (discussing the impact of side payments).
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This is a step the Delaware courts have been unwilling to take. The
reason they have declined to do so is probably captured by Chancellor
Allen’s warning that, unless Unocal was carefully applied, “courts—in
exercising some element of substantive judgment—will too readily seek to
assert the primacy of their own view on a question upon which reasonable,
completely disinterested minds might differ.”357 This is true even with
respect to the adequacy of the price received by the target, as the Delaware
Supreme Court explained in Time, by stating that courts should not
substitute their “judgment as to what is a ‘better’ deal for that of a
corporation’s board of directors.”358
This is so, the Court explained, because “Delaware law confers the
management of the corporate enterprise to the stockholders’ duly elected
board representatives. . . . That duty may not be delegated to the
stockholders.”359 Prior to Lukens and its progeny, the Delaware courts thus
seemed to recognize the tension between authority and accountability that
was discussed in Part I.C above. Indeed, it is striking how precisely
Chancellor Allen’s warning echoes the argument above that one cannot
make an actor more accountable without simultaneously transferring some
aliquot of his decision-making authority to the entity empowered to hold
him to account. As we saw in that part, there are strong policy reasons not
to do so even in the context of corporate acquisitions. Accordingly, the
Delaware courts should not go further down the road toward applying a
substantive reasonableness analysis to all corporate acquisitions.360
CONCLUSION
Revlon should be understood as a special case of the Unocal heightened
scrutiny standard of review. The target board of directors’ sole Revlon duty
is to obtain the best deal for their shareholders. In so doing, any favoritism
of one bidder over another must be motivated by a concern for immediate
shareholder value and not by any improper motives.
One enters Revlon-land through any one of three checkpoints: (1) the
target’s board initiates an active bidding process to sell the corporation or to
effect a business reorganization involving a clear breakup of the company;
(2) in response to an initial offer, the target’s board causes the corporation
to abandon the corporation’s long-term strategy and seeks an alternative

357. City Capital Assocs. L.P. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1988).
358. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990).
359. Id. at 1154.
360. Taken to its logical extreme, Vice Chancellor Laster’s concern that an acquisition is
a final period transaction representing the last occasion on which the target’s board and
management can maximize the value of the target’s shares suggests that even a substantive
reasonableness standard would not suffice as a standard of review. After all, if that is the
concern, the reason the target board failed to obtain an adequate price would be irrelevant.
The sole inquiry would be whether the price was adequate. Such a rule, however, would
substitute the court’s judgment for that of the board in all cases. This observation thus
further confirms the extent to which Steinhardt is an outlier in Delaware jurisprudence.
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transaction involving the breakup of the company; (3) the transaction
results in a sale or change of control of the corporation.
Contrary to recent chancery court opinions, Checkpoint 3 is not
dependent on the form of the consideration paid by the acquirer. If
dispersed shareholders own the post-transaction combined entity in “a
large, fluid, changeable and changing market,” Revlon does not apply. If
the post-transaction entity has a controlling shareholder, however,
regardless of whether the corporation goes private or remains listed on a
stock market, Revlon does apply. In other words, there must be a change of
control, whether by sale or otherwise.

